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To every individual who, in a world that has lost its direction and refuses to pay 
attention, has hope still. May your truth be heard loud enough. May you find justice at 
last. 
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istory lives on in South Africa. The claim that almost every issue 
in the country can be traced back to its history of apartheid 
remains overwhelmingly true. To this day, the divisive legacy of that system of 
racial segregation continues to impact the lives of South Africans in many ways. 
For instance, alongside Brazil, South Africa has the most unequal income 
distribution in the world.1 The large degree of economic disparity has in turn 
been identified as the source of various social maladies, such as high levels of 
criminal violence in the country.2 Moreover, the violence that characterized 
apartheid did not necessarily diminish with the official end of the regime. It has 
taken on new forms in the post-apartheid era and continues to be a daily 
feature in South Africa, a phenomenon which has been cast as the product of a 
―culture of violence.‖3 Although data provided by the Minister of Police Nathi 
Mthethwar point to falling rates of crime in 2010, the country is still perceived 
as among the most violent in the world.4 Within this context, race has been at 
the center of widespread debate.  
Race remains a contentious topic among South Africans. It is the most 
salient element in the lives of millions in the country for a number of reasons. 
Economic inequality, for instance, is highly racialized. According to figures 
from the United Nations Development Program, ―the standard of living of 
                                                          
1
 Villa-Vicencio & Ngesi. “South Africa: Beyond the Miracle”, in Erik Doxtader and Charles Villa-Vicencio, 
eds. Through Fire with Water: The Roots of Division and the Potential for Reconciliation in Africa. Cape 
Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2003. Pg. 278 
2
 Bruce, David. “To be someone: Status insecurity and violence in South Africa”, in Patrick Burton, ed. 
Someone Stole my Smile: an Exploration into the Causes of Youth Violence in South Africa. Cape Town: 
Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention, November 2007. Pg. 57 
3
 Shaw, Mark. “Confronting the Violent Society” Crime and Policing in Post-apartheid South Africa, 
Chapter 3. Pg. 53 
4
 “Crime Stats: Murders fall by 8,6%” Mail&Guardian, September 9, 2010. Accessed in September, 2010 
at http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-09-09-crime-stats-murders-fall-by-86 
H 
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average Black South Africans is comparable to the 124th most wealthy nation in 
the world (after Congo), whereas for the average white South African it is 
comparable to the 24th (after Spain).‖5 Violence also affects the population along 
racial lines. Wealthy South Africans are twice as likely as the poor to be victims 
of property-related crime, and yet the likelihood of dying in these incidents is 
80 times more likely for poor South Africans, who are overwhelmingly non-
white.6 Yet, there appears to be an aversion to labeling many everyday acts of 
prejudice as racially-based due to a ―social silence about racism.‖7 Nevertheless, 
this apparent unwillingness to openly talk about the impact of race in society is 
counterbalanced by the media‘s portrayal of it. 
Every so often, news stories with a strong racial undercurrent bring to 
light the still unresolved issues of race that characterize post-apartheid South 
Africa. A study undertaken by the Media Monitoring Group suggests an 
increase in the frequency of the media‘s attention to racially - based incidents in 
the post-1999 period.8 High-profile cases like the April 2010 assassination of 
Eugene Terre‘blanche - one of the most vocal defenders of apartheid and 
founder of the far-right Afrikaner resistance movement Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) - at the hands of two of his black workers, 
instigated a renewed discussion on the role of race as a predictor of violence in 
                                                          
5
 UNDP data, as quoted in Hamber, Brandon, “Have no Doubt, it is Fear in the Land: An Exploration of 
the Continuing Cycles of Violence in South Africa”, Zeitschrift für Politische Psychologie, 1999.Pg. 117 
6
 Steinberg, 1999 quoted in Hamber, Brandon, “Have no Doubt, it is Fear in the Land: An Exploration of 
the Continuing Cycles of Violence in South Africa”, Zeitschrift für Politische Psychologie, 1999. Pg. 117 
7
 Harris, Bronwyn. “Spaces of Violence, Places of Fear: Urban Conflict in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa.”Paper presented on the Conflicts and Urban Social Violence panel in Colombia. Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Web. http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/urbansafety/englishspaces.pdf 
8
 Media Monitoring Group, “Shares of Prejudice: An investigation into the South African media’s 
coverage of racial violence and xenophobia.” Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Web. 
http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/foreigners/shades.pdf (hereinafter MMP). 
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South Africa. Likewise, the Reitz Four incident at Free State University in 
February of 2008, in which four white students were shown humiliating five 
black workers in a notorious internet video, brought to the surface another 
national debate about ongoing racial prejudice. Although only a few explicitly 
racial events receive wide coverage by the media, they serve as the symbolic 
representations of the small scale incidents that take place on a daily basis, 
thereby disclosing the sentiments of many South Africans in regards to race.  
These recent race-related incidents lead one to re-examine South Africa‘s 
engagement in a process of reconciliation with the end of white-minority rule. 
More than a decade after the fall of the repressive regime, racially-charged 
events like those just previously outlined reflect a rather fragmented picture of 
the ‗rainbow nation‘. These events beg the fundamental question of whether or 
not South Africans have been able to depart from the racial foundation that 
defined their relations in the past, and if not, why not. These events cast the 
spotlight on the transitional justice process, and whether it in any way relates to 
how race continues to impact society today.  
This thesis will assess the state of race relations in South African society, 
fifteen years after the end of apartheid. It will analyze the current racial context 
in relation to the reconciliation process that the country undertook in the 
aftermath of that system of racial segregation. The preliminary hypothesis that 
motivates this research is that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 
directed by the Parliamentary Act that established it, failed to properly 
integrate a discussion of race and racism into its work. Particularly, that the 
12 
 
conflict came to be understood in terms of victims of a small scope of human 
rights violations and perpetrators of those violations posed certain limitations 
on reconciliation. In the same manner, the way in which the media reported the 
TRC process only added to a lack of structural analysis about apartheid. 
Although extensive, the media limited its work to covering the TRC hearings 
without subjecting the content of the information they gathered to deeper 
criticism. Hence, by ignoring the context of the events described and discussed 
in the Commission, the media deepened the analysis gap of the transitional 
justice process. Ultimately, the TRC and the media‘s downplay of race as the 
explanatory variable for the violations that occurred during apartheid may have 
contributed to race relations that remain problematic in contemporary South 
Africa. 
On the one hand, apartheid was, by all means and most essentially, a 
system of racial segregation. On the other hand, the Commission strove to take 
a higher stance by ―casting the net of blame‖ on all sides.9 In this context, the 
language that guided the work of the Commission is relevant, since it may have 
downplayed or dismissed the ‗race factor‘.10 Similarly, the media, a key player 
in the dissemination of the TRC‘s work, reflected this stance through the 
framing of the information it delivered to the audience that followed the 
process. Hence, the sidestepping of race in the TRC and the media may have 
represented a missed opportunity to understand the framework that led to the 
                                                          
9
 Gibson, James. “Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?”The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, (2006) 603:82. Pg. 103 
10
 Fullard,Madeleine, “Displacing Race: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and 
Interpretations of Violence”, Race and Citizenship in Transition Series. Centre for the Study of Violence 
and Reconciliation. Pg. vii (hereinafter Fullard) 
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establishment of and maintained apartheid in place for more than forty years. 
The subject of this thesis is the ongoing consequences of this missed 
opportunity.  
With the demise of white-minority rule, the question of how to reconcile 
South Africans was pressing. The human rights violations of that regime had to 
be dealt with to set the foundations for a more peaceful environment in the 
future. Leaders rejected the immediate option of trials and decided to opt for 
the establishment of a truth commission, an increasingly common transitional 
justice mechanism. Transitional justice is defined as ―the attempts of new 
governments in regimes that have recently undergone a transition to 
democracy to establish a process to hold members of the former regime and 
those against it accountable for gross violations of human rights that occurred 
during their tenure.‖11 Truth commissions have been established in countries 
around the world in the hope of preventing future violence.12 Arguably, the 
most famous truth commission has been the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  
The TRC was the foundation of the transitional justice process of post-
apartheid South Africa. In 1995, the South African Parliament passed the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act no. 34, which established 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).13 According to the TRC 
                                                          
11
 Borer, Tristan,“Truth Telling as a Peacebuilding Activity.” Tristan Borer, ed. Telling the Truths: Truth 
Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. 
Pg.17 
12
 Hayner, Priscilla. “The Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity”, Vol. 3. Macmillan 
Reference USA, 2004. Pg. 1045-1047 
13
Borer, Tristan,“Truth, Reconciliation and Justice”, Peace Review (1999) 11:2. Pg. 306 
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Report, the Act dictated that the major objectives of the Commission would be 
to promote ―national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which 
transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past.‖14 The Act established that 
these objectives-national unity and reconciliation- should be accomplished by:  
 Establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature 
and extent of the gross violations of human rights which were 
committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off 
date, including the antecedents, circumstances, factors and context 
of such violations, as well as the perspectives of the victims and 
the motives and perspectives of the persons responsible for the 
commission of the violations, by conducting investigations and 
holding hearings.  
 Facilitating the granting of amnesty to persons who make full 
disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a 
political objective and comply with the requirements of this Act;  
 Establishing and making known the fate or whereabouts of 
victims and by restoring the human and civil dignity of such 
victims by granting them an opportunity to relate their own 
accounts of the violations of which they are the victims, and by 
recommending reparation measures in respect of them; 
 Compiling a report providing as comprehensive an account as 
possible of the activities and findings of the Commission […] and 
which contains recommendations of measures to prevent the 
future violations of human rights.15 
 
Thus, the TRC had several goals, one of which was to restore the dignity of 
victims by acknowledging their stories. In terms of perpetrators, the 
Commission was in charge of providing amnesty to them in exchange for the 
                                                          
14
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. 1, Final Report, 55 (hereinafter TRC Final Report 1). 
15
TRC Final Report 1, supra note 14, at 55. 
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full disclosure of the truth about the acts they committed. According to the Act, 
actions that could constitute gross violations of human rights included killing, 
abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment.16 This definition, among other 
concepts that the Commission had to interpret, has been subject to criticism by 
several scholars.  
  The fact that human rights violations were narrowed down to specific 
acts has been criticized and deemed as a factor that limited the TRC‘s capacity 
to address structural issues. Tristan Borer notes this critique of the definitions of 
gross violations of human rights, which emphasizes how bodily-integrity rights 
could ignore the relevance of the violation of socio-economic rights:  
―The decision of the Commission to concentrate only on violations 
committed as specific acts…meant that victims of forced removals or of 
Bantu education or any other of a myriad of laws passed by the 
apartheid government, or of the effects of those laws including hunger, 
poverty, and the lack of basic health care would not be deemed victims 
according to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.‖17 
 
Some scholars hold the view that a structural analysis of how the system of 
apartheid itself affected the fabric of society was overlooked in the process of 
the TRC. Kader Asmal and Mahmood Mamdani suggest that this narrow focus 
on violations of bodily-integrity rights ―ignored the implicit wider mandate of 
the Act‖, which according to them, ―…included the wider structural violations 
of apartheid based upon racial discrimination.‖18 Other scholars, however, have 
identified that the very Act dismisses specific references to apartheid, race or 
                                                          
16 “Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995” Truth and  Reconciliation 
Commission. Web. 
17
 Borer, Tristan. “A Taxonomy of Victims and Perpetrators: Human Rights and Reconciliation in South 
Africa”, Human Rights Quarterly 25, 2005. Pg. 1092 (hereinafter Borer, “A Taxonomy of Victims and 
Perpetrators”). 
18
 Fullard, 2. 
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racism, and that these omissions had a clear impact on the work of the TRC.19 
Similarly, the lack of a concrete understanding of what reconciliation should 
entail has added to the ongoing debate.  
The TRC was given the task of laying the groundwork for reconciliation 
without a clear definition of what was meant by this objective. Borer shows 
how the very mandate that established the Commission did nothing more than 
spell out the tasks that ought to lead to reconciliation, without really grappling 
with the full meaning of this fundamental concept.20 Similarly, Hamber states, 
―Reconciliation as an objective proved problematic. During the lifetime of the 
Commission, the term was never defined nor was a shared understanding 
ascertained.‖21 As a result, people could easily hold expectations that did not 
match up to the real delivery-capacity of the TRC, or have competing ideas of 
what a ‗reconciled‘ South African should look like.22 Although at least one 
research study presents an improved picture of social relations in South 
Africa,23 the 2010 South African Reconciliation Barometer offered a rather 
negative perception of the status of reconciliation in the country. In fact, the 
Barometer identifies that racial relations, among other dimensions of 
reconciliation, presents the greatest challenges.24 The lack of conceptual clarity 
has had continuing effects, since the question of who should have reconciled 
                                                          
19
 Fullard, 29. 
20
 Borer,Tristan, “Reconciling South Africa or South Africans: Cautionary Notes from the TRC”, African 
Studies Quarterly, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2004. Pg. 23. (hereinafter Borer, “Cautionary Notes from the TRC”) 
21
 Hamber, Brandon, “Ere their Story Die: truth, justice and reconciliation in South Africa” Race&Class, 
Vol. 44 (1), 2002. Pg. 66 
22
 Borer, “Cautionary Notes from the TRC”, supra note 20, at 23. 
23
 See James Gibson’s “Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?”, The ANNALS of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2006 603:82. Pg. 103. 
24
 Lefko-Everett, Kate, Rorisang Lekalake, Erica Penfold and Sana Rais,“2010 South African Reconciliation 
Barometer Survey Report.” Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. www.ijr.org.za (hereinafter SARB 
2010).  
17 
 
with whom remains subject to debate. In this respect, the language of victims‘ 
and ‗perpetrators‘ that defined the work of the Commission, as originally 
established by its founding Act, becomes important.  
The TRC‘s framing of the past as a conflict between ‗victims‘ and 
‗perpetrators‘ may have misrepresented the nature of relationships during 
apartheid-which were essentially racial-  and could explain the unresolved 
issues with race that surface in post-apartheid South Africa, which become 
evident in both the Barometer and the Terreblanche and Reitz Four incidents. 
The founding Act of the TRC makes use of these terms, by referring to 
―perspectives of victims‖ or ―motives of persons responsible for the 
commission of the violations‖.25 The TRC applied this language throughout its 
work, arguing for example that reconciliation should encompass ―forgiveness 
and healing between victim and perpetrator.‖26 This language is perceived as 
problematic because it disregarded the many individuals who in one way or 
another were involved in the system of apartheid:  ―While the TRC certified 
only approximately 20,000 individuals as victims and fewer than 10,000 
individuals as perpetrators […] apartheid surely had more 30,000 victims and 
perpetrators.‖27 In a similar vein, Mamdani argues that the South African TRC 
left unaddressed the all-pervading nature of apartheid, a regime that did not 
target a particular number of individuals but rather attacked whole 
                                                          
25
 TRC Final Report 1, supra note 14, at 55. 
26
 TRC Final Report 1, supra note 14, at 55. 
27
Borer, “A Taxonomy of Victims and Perpetrators”, supra note 17, at 1102. 
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communities.28 In light of Tina Rosenberg‘s description of ―criminal regimes‖, 
one can begin to see how the violations of apartheid were largely 
bureaucratized and carried out by entire organizations. 29 This fact carried 
important implications, since it was difficult to spread the blame across all 
sectors of society. Mamdani says that accountability was not justly distributed, 
since the ‗beneficiaries‘, those who by virtue of their whiteness benefited from 
the regime, did not fall under the scope of work of the TRC in terms of 
perpetrators. He poses the question: ―How will those who continue to be the 
beneficiaries of apartheid, a substantial minority, and those who continue to be 
its victims, the majority, live together?‖30 In a survey carried out by the Institute 
for Justice and Reconciliation in 2003, less than a third of former beneficiaries 
acknowledged that they benefited from apartheid.31 Hence, the ‗victims‘ and 
‗perpetrators‘ categories may have entailed the disengagement from ―black and 
white‖issues. 32 In this discussion, the role of the media in engaging larger 
society in the TRC process is crucial.   
 The media played a key role throughout the life of the TRC. Alex Boraine 
has recognized how the Commission owes much of its success to the media, 
and how the entire effort of the TRC could have been wasted had it not been for 
the active involvement of broadcasting agencies, the press and the radio to 
                                                          
28
 Mamdani, Mahmood. “A Diminished Truth”, W. James and L. Van de Vijver eds. After the TRC: 
reflection on truth and reconciliation in South Africa. Cape Town: David Philip, 2000. Pg. 59 
29
 Rosenberg, Tina. “Dealing with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa.” Alex Boraine, Janet 
Levy and Ronel Scheffer, eds. IDASA. Cape Town: Clyson Printers. Pg. 96 
30
 Mamdani, 59 
31
 Valji, Nahla. “Race and Recociliation in Post-TRC South Africa”, paper presented at a conference 
entitled Ten Years of Democracy in Southern Africa. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. 
Web. http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/racism/raceandreconciliation.pdf 
32
 Fullard, 32 
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convey to South African society what came out of the hearings.33 The 
relationship between the TRC and the media has been described as 
―symbiotic,‖34 a term that refers to the manner in which they have impacted 
each other. For instance, one analysis that was carried out in 1997 placed the 
success or the failure of the Commission on the work of the media: ―Television, 
newspaper and radio journalists are going to observe this delicate and 
necessary operation and when they turn away from the operating table and 
report to the waiting world outside, their reports will be as important as the 
work of the commissioners themselves in determining whether the operation 
was a success or not.‖35 In the same manner, in reporting what was coming out 
of the TRC process, media workers also found themselves examining their own 
positions in relation to the past that the TRC was working with: ―…As the 
process […] unfolded, journalists […] found themselves being pulled into the 
events covered. Some were victims of human rights abuses themselves; some 
were perpetrators; some found themselves implicated as part of the group who 
benefited from apartheid.‖36 These statements reveal the relevance of looking at 
the role of the media in the transitional justice process and the relationship it 
had with the TRC. Particularly important to investigate is how the media may 
                                                          
33
 Garman, Anthea. “How the TRC and the media have impacted on each other.” Track Two journal of 
the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Vol. 6 No. 3&4, December 1997. Web. 
http://www.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/6_34/p36_garman.html (hereinafter Garman, “How the TRC and 
the media have impacted on each other”) 
34
 Krabill, Ron. “Symbiosis: mass media and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa.” 
Media Culture Society 2001 23:567.  
35
 Bird, Edward and Zureida Garda. “Reporting the Truth Commission: Analysis of Media Coverage of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa.” International Communication Gazette. October 
1997. Pg. 334 
36
 Garman, “How the TRC and the media have impacted on each other”, supra note 33.  
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have added to the dismissal of race and racism as explanatory variables of the 
events that fell under the purview of the Commission‘s work.  
  The media‘s coverage of the TRC may have downplayed a debate on the 
elements of race and racism and their relation to crimes of the past. According 
to findings of the Media Monitoring Group, the media projected the cases of the 
Commission in political and human rights terms, with minimal reference to 
race and racism.37 They limited their work to mere reporting without engaging 
in a more critical approach to the process, a fact that some regard as having 
undermined the role of investigative journalism in South Africa.38 Furthermore, 
some groups within the media were in an ambivalent position, because from 
having once been ‗beneficiaries‘ of apartheid they suddenly became key players 
in the reconciliation process.39 This contradiction was best exposed through the 
institutional hearings of the TRC‘s Human Rights Violations Committee. 
Among other sectors of society, the media were called to account in these 
hearings as a way to explore their involvement during apartheid and delve into 
a more tangible discussion about the structural aspects of the regime.40 These 
discussions and others will be furthered in the thesis with the hope that the 
impact of the transitional justice process on race relations in South Africa will 
come to the surface more clearly. 
                                                          
37
 MMP, supra note 8  
38
 Rolston, Bill. “Facing Reality: The media, the past and conflict transformation in Northern Ireland.” 
Crime, Media, Culture. 2007 3:345. Pg. 355 
39
 Rolston, supra note 38 
40
 Fullard, 35 
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 In Chapter 2, some of the most prominent views and arguments of the 
literature on truth commissions and media in transitional justice processes will 
be discussed. This discussion will help to identify how this thesis adds to the 
assessment literature on truth commissions in general. In chapter 3, the origins 
of the TRC will be described, followed by a discussion of the main critiques of 
the Commission and the media‘s work will follow. The chapter will focus on 
the political negotiations that shaped some of the key aspects of the transitional 
justice process that followed the end of apartheid, the reasons for which judicial 
trials were ruled out and the events that led to the insertion of the provision of 
amnesty in the post-amble of the new Constitution. A description of the Act 
that established the TRC and the implications of the terminology that 
Commissioners had to use will be examined, because these implications build 
much of the basis of scholarly critique of the truth-telling process of South 
Africa. Related to this, the debate about the impact of the TRC process and the 
media on race relations will be expanded. In chapter 4, a look at both James 
Gibson‘s findings about race relations and data from South African 
Reconciliation Barometer will reveal the complexity that is inherent to analyses 
of racial reconciliation in the country. For this reason, an analysis of two major 
events that involved discussion on the state of race relations in South Africa-the 
Reitz Four incident and the murder of Eugene Terre‘Blanche-is warranted. 
These events will be the case studies for testing the hypothesis of this thesis. In 
chapter 5, the connections between the findings of these cases, the questions 
22 
 
that motivated this research and the literature on truth commissions and media 
in general will be forwarded.  
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he establishment of truth commissions in the aftermath of violent 
conflicts has become commonplace. Starting with the demise of 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America in the 1980s, more than thirty truth 
commissions in different countries around the world have been established.41 
At a basic level, these bodies are set up for the purpose of investigating gross 
violations of human rights that were carried out at during the time period of a 
particular regime.42 The establishment of these truth commissions, however, 
does not bring closure to the debate about how societies should deal with their 
past. The field of transitional justice encompasses a range of mechanisms that 
can serve to hold the supporters of a previous regime as well as those opposed 
to it accountable for the violations of human rights that took place throughout 
that regime‘s term.43 Countries that have gone through a transition to 
democracy, like some in Latin American and the Balkans region, have 
particularly rich histories in this field. As these countries strove to implement 
democratic governments and instill a human rights culture, the question of how 
to move on from their pasts became more pressing.  
People have held different views about which mechanisms are the most 
appropriate for establishing justice in a post-conflict society. On one side, there 
is always support for punishment of former perpetrators in the form of 
prosecutions. Judiciary trials can deliver this form of justice. On the other side, 
                                                          
41
 “Transitional Justice”, International Center for Transitional Justice. Web. Accessed on March, 2011 at  
http://es.ictj.org/static/TJApproaches/WhatisTJ/  
42
 supra note 41 
43
 Borer, Tristan. “Truth Telling as a Peacebuilding Activity: A Theoretical Overview”, Tristan Borer ed. 
Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies. Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. Pg. 17 (hereinafter Borer, “Truth Telling as a Peace Building 
Activity”). 
 T 
25 
 
there are those who value disclosure of the truth about past violations and 
redress for the wrongdoing that has been done by means other than 
prosecutions. Truth commissions are usually favored among individuals in the 
latter group. These commissions are not necessarily limited to collecting the 
facts of the past. In fact, a central premise is that this exercise will have an effect 
on the future, in the sense that exposure and condemnation of certain past 
events will prevent their repetition.44 Truth commissions are often put in place 
with other defining expectations, such as providing an official platform where 
victims can commence healing through acknowledgement of their suffering. 
Also, through the often public shaming that could accompany the open 
disclosure of wrongdoings, truth commissions might provide some degree of 
punishment to perpetrators.45 Yet, as the transitional justice field evolves, and 
the likelihood that truth telling mechanisms become more standard procedure 
grows, the ideas and expectations that motivate their promotion still remain 
largely untested.  
The assessment of truth telling processes poses challenges to empirical 
research that begin in the field of transitional justice. Hugo van der Merwe 
recognizes two main issues that are difficult to address or to measure regarding 
mechanisms of justice in times of transition. The first issue, he says, is the lack 
of agreement of what justice should look like in the context of a transition, as it 
has already been mentioned.46 What are the appropriate justice procedures and 
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what would the outcome of such procedures be? The second issue, with which 
this thesis is particularly concerned, has to do with the lack of consensus on 
assessment of the impact of a justice mechanism.47 In the words of van der 
Merwe, after the implementation of a transitional justice process, has justice 
actually been delivered? If so, to what extent?48  These are difficult questions to 
answer that also apply to understandings of truth telling mechanisms. Do truth 
telling processes achieve the number of expectations that are assigned to them 
in reality? What research methods can elucidate the degree to which the work 
of truth commissions has an effect? For the international acclaim that it received 
in the past and the constant recognition it still has in academic circles, the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is a good case in point for 
a much needed review of what truth commissions can accomplish in actuality. 
The TRC is arguably one of the most widely known models of a robust 
truth-telling process. It is also one of the most studied and debated truth 
commissions in academia.49 However, beyond the fact that scholars have 
discussed at length the factors that led to the establishment of the TRC, as well 
as the shortcomings and the successes of the process, analyses of the impact of 
the Commission in the long term may only begin to be reasonably feasible now-
close to ten years after the TRC ceased its work officially. Thus, this thesis has 
the privilege of hindsight. With more perspective, the effect of the 
Commission‘s work can be assessed from different angles, and many events 
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have taken place in South Africa since the Commission finished its work that 
offer opportunities for  more in-depth analysis. An exercise in retrospection and 
an effort to draw the possible connections between the transitional justice 
process and the present is not only important for understanding the scope of 
influence of the Commission in South Africa. On a general level, the social and 
political features of the periods that follow truth commissions need to be taken 
into account to see the ways in which the premises for the establishment of 
these commissions (one of the central premises being that looking at the crimes 
that were committed in the past will guarantee that they are never again 
repeated) materialize. Only by continuously testing the connection between the 
premises and the facts on the ground, knowledge about areas of strength and 
areas where truth commissions can improve be gleaned.  
In an attempt to add a research project that can be of value to the 
transitional justice literature, this thesis will look at contemporary race relations 
in South Africa as not only defined by the still recent history of apartheid, but 
as deeply connected to the transitional process that succeeded the demise of the 
racist regime. In fact, the notion of a ―post-TRC South Africa‖ suggests that the 
Commission‘s work may have transcended into the present as it was originally 
expected.50 Have the goals of ―national unity and reconciliation‖, as stated in 
the Post-amble that sanctioned the TRC, been achieved? In regards to 
contemporary forms of racism, can they be attributed to some failure in the 
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work of the Commission? Before these questions are considered, an overview of 
different transitional justice mechanisms is warranted 
Transitional Justice 
 Measures of justice respond to the particular needs of the contexts in 
which they are applied. They are also contingent upon the social and political 
processes that lead to their implementation. When countries undergo a 
transition from a regime that sanctioned violations of human rights to one that 
strives to embrace a culture that rejects those same violations and wants to 
uphold democratic standards, the question of how to achieve justice becomes 
crucial. The field of transitional justice covers the array of possible answers to 
this question. The International Center for Transitional Justice, perhaps the 
major think tank in the field, identifies the following transitional justice 
initiatives: criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparation programs, 
gender justice, and memorialization projects.51 Also, local or ―traditional‖ 
rituals that have value in communities are beginning to figure as valid 
mechanisms that can accompany other transitional justice measures.52  
The establishment of these initiatives depends on the circumstances of 
the transitional period of a country, such as the type of political dispensations 
and sometimes even the cultural values of a society. Nevertheless, for almost 
every society that has emerged from a period of violent conflict, the question of 
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justice has emerged.53 A tension generally arises between people who call for 
the application of what Neil Kritz calls ―non-criminal sanctions‖ and those who 
advocate for the prosecutions of people who are accused of certain crimes.54  
The implementation of a retributive justice process, in the form of 
criminal trials and the adoption of punishment measures is one approach in the 
pursuit of a break from the past. Kritz explains that the foundational support 
for retribution is that only swift condemnation of past crimes will place a new 
government apart from the predecessor.55 Indeed, Juan Mendez warns that not 
abiding by the rule of law could be taken as tacit complicity with the 
wrongdoers, which could undermine the legitimacy of the new government. He 
says: ―One of the political arguments for prosecution is that if we are building a 
new democracy we must start with a non-discriminatory application of the 
law.‖56 Furthermore, he also stresses that for certain crimes, such as torture or 
murder on a massive and systematic scale, nothing short of prosecutions should 
be admissible: ―In cases of crimes against humanity, there is always a clear duty 
to prosecute and not to give amnesties or pardons.‖57 This is a view that is more 
commonly shared among victims of violations of human rights. Their demand 
for prosecutions stems from the perception that the only way to achieve justice 
is by punishing perpetrators for their deeds. For many of them, the idea of 
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foregoing trials and punishment for truth commissions and in some cases 
amnesty can be hard to accept.58 In South Africa, many victims expressed that 
the TRC process engendered a sense of betrayal in them, particularly the 
provision of amnesty to some perpetrators. They argued that their right to 
justice had been traded for truth, and that compensations or reparations could 
not be a real substitute for punishment.59 At the same time, some former regime 
supporters in South Africa argued that did not want to become victims of 
―retributive witch hunts.‖60 However, moral, legal and practical reasons, to be 
detailed in Chapter 3, precluded the adoption of a punitive process as the 
avenue for justice in post-apartheid South Africa.  
In transitional contexts, justice measures are as much tied to the political 
environment as they are to pragmatic calculations. The nature of the transition 
from one regime to another and the length of the previous regime‘s tenure often 
determine the transitional justice mechanism that is ultimately chosen. Some 
political transitions, according to Chilean philosopher Jose Zalaquett, diminish 
the prospects of trials. For example, if the former regime has not lost all of its 
power, there will have to be more room for compromise, which could entail 
ruling out punitive trials. The cases of post-WWII Germany and Japan are 
telling: ―The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials could work the way they did only 
because the guilty lost their political power and their guns. Their defeat was 
complete and the conquerors needed only to wrestle with their own sense of 
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justice.‖61 In South Africa, however, the National Party did not lose its hold of 
power completely and could still influence the outcome of debates on justice 
measures for apartheid supporters. For instance, the amnesty clause of the 
interim Constitution‘s post-amble reflected the compromises of the political 
negotiations that preceded the end of apartheid.62 Also, amnesty was a tangible 
gesture to NP officials calmed their fears of being persecuted by ―retributive 
witch hunts‖, as some referred to judiciary trials, after the elections.63 Important 
as amnesty was to prevent deadlocks in the political negotiations, this 
provision, however, significantly reduced the likelihood of punishment of 
perpetrators.  
Another reason why the implementation of criminal trials might be 
limited is the scope of influence of the repressive regime. The more widespread 
was a regime‘s influence in society, the harder it becomes to point at those who 
should deserve punishment. Tina Rosenberg notes that the systematic nature of 
the violations of apartheid made the prospect of prosecuting every human 
rights violator hardly attainable. She says that apartheid was not a system in 
which only a few within it committed transgression. Instead, the system as a 
whole was a transgression, inducing large numbers of people to take part in 
those transgressions. Apartheid as a whole was a ―criminal regime‖, similar to 
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the Eastern European cases.64 Hence, apart from being possibly too costly to 
carry out trials, it might be too complicated to apply fair punitive measures. 
Moreover, Kritz says that in some places the previous regime could have been 
in place for such a long period of time that the only people who have the 
practical knowledge to run basic administrative tasks of government are 
precisely the ones who would be targeted by policies such as the ones carried 
out in France and Czech Republic. The absence of these administrative 
personnel could endanger the viability of institutions of key relevance for the 
new government.65 Aside from these purely practical reasons, there are also 
legal norms that weaken the case for retributive processes of justice.  
The legitimacy of the democratic foundations of a new regime could be 
threatened in the face of a blind punitive process. Kritz says that the rule of law 
protects individuals from collective punishment in cases where the possibility 
of removing former regime workers from the state apparatus is considered.66  
The rule of law guarantees that political affiliation would not suffice as a reason 
for expelling people from their job places, unless there is evidence of individual 
wrongdoing.67 Similarly, Rosenberg argues that basic legal principles that 
underscore democratic orders prevent the prosecution of people ―for an act 
which was not criminal at the time it was committed‖ (i.e. ex post facto and nulla 
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poena sine lege).68 Hence, a new government which aims to punish individuals 
by virtue of who they were associated with in the past can actually run counter 
to what the rule of law establishes. Such punishment method risk the 
democratic credentials that a new government wants to earn, and will possibly 
alienate sectors of the population which are crucial in supporting the new 
system.69 These are some of the arguments that underpin the support of justice 
mechanisms that would be less likely to sow the grounds for revenge or 
retaliation.   
 Beyond the legal and practical reasons motivating the choice of a justice 
mechanism other than criminal trials, there is a strong body of literature that 
highlights the benefits of the disclosure of truth about the past in a democratic 
transition. According to Zalaquett, in the aftermath of a repressive regime, what 
is important is to gather as much truth about the past as it is possible in order to 
prevent its repetition. He says, ―If you are going to prevent something, you 
must know what it is that you want to prevent. If you are going to repair, what 
is it that you are going to repair?‖70 Criminal trials could be an avenue through 
which accurate information might be gathered. However, in Zalaquett‘s view, 
trials are unfit for the purpose of truth gathering, especially if the aim is not 
limited to holding people to account but also steering a national debate.71 
Furthermore, trials can undermine justice, especially in cases of total victory 
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where the winners can engage in extensive punishment that may not 
necessarily be reflective of a pursuit of justice but rather of vengeance.72 Most 
importantly, there should be an effort to place peoples‘ actions in context before 
hurrying to judge them individually. Zalaquett argues that most people act in 
ways that respond to the context in which they are placed.73 Under most 
circumstances, people are more likely to abide by social rules that appear 
legitimate rather than defy them and risk stigmatization. The question that 
follows is: how to apply measures of punishment that individuals should 
receive when the system under which they committed violations actually 
sanctioned those violations? In this case, punitive trials can be rather 
inadequate for such complex scenarios. Sometimes what is important is to 
understand this complexity rather than to assign culpability to a particular side 
of a conflict. In this respect, a truth commission can be an effective option to 
mediate with the demands for justice and to establish fair measures of 
accountability.  
Truth Commissions 
 At a basic level, truth commissions are an alternative justice mechanism 
that responds to the question of how to deal with the past. Regardless of the 
mandate terms that may establish truth commissions, a backward-looking 
quality is the common denominator among them.74 Priscilla Hayner outlines the 
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following basic aims of a truth commission: ―To discover, clarify, and formally 
acknowledge past abuses; to respond to specific needs of victims; to contribute 
to justice and accountability; to outline institutional responsibility and 
recommend reforms; and to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the 
past.‖75 A number of untested assumptions have emerged around these 
qualities. One of the main assumptions is that societies need to learn about their 
past in order to prevent future conflict.76 In this respect, the backward-looking 
approach of a truth commission is meant to fulfill a preventive role in the 
future. Also, through the recognition of the stories of previously disempowered 
people, some important degree of justice could be achieved in the present. 
Another assumption is that encouraging victims and perpetrators to come 
together and talk about their stories can enable reconciliation among them.77 
Alongside, learning about the needs of victims can facilitate the making of 
recommendations for reform.78 Thus, truth commissions acquire a reparative or 
restorative capacity. Although these and other assumptions are often 
mentioned, the difficulty of corroborating their veracity with factual evidence 
engenders a constant debate between those who support truth telling processes 
and those who remain more skeptical about their effectiveness. This dimension 
of the debate on truth commissions is important to keep in mind, and this thesis 
will wrestle with it extensively. In examining whether race relations in South 
Africa today are in any way a by-product of the transitional justice process that 
                                                          
75
 Hayner, “Unspeakable Truths”, supra note 53, at 24 
76
 Rotberg, “Truth Commissions”, supra note 74, at 3 
77
See James Gibson, “The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons from South Africa.”  Journal 
of Conflict Resolution. (2006) 50(3):409-432. 
78
 Hayner, “Unspeakable Truths”, supra note 53, at 25 
36 
 
the country went through, the assumed capacities of prevention and restoration 
of the TRC will be examined. 
Truth Commissions: Prevention and Restoration 
An aspect that is often attributed to truth commissions is their capacity to 
collect and produce an account of the past that can help to prevent the 
repetition of violent conflict. Through the disclosure of truth, facts can be 
gathered to paint a more complete picture of the past, which in turn would 
supposedly deter people from committing the same violations.79 Zalaquett says 
that this is sometimes more important than prosecuting every human rights 
violator. Apart from unifying a society, the elaboration of a collective history 
might serve the desire of preventing future conflict better than the choice of 
retributive justice. Having a common understanding of the past as opposed to 
different and unreconciled versions of it can move society towards embracing 
the same values: ―A community should not wipe out part of its past, because it 
leaves a vacuum that will be filled by lies and contradictory, confusing accounts 
of what happened. Identity is memory […] Identities forged out of half-
remembered things or false memories easily commit transgressions.‖80 Alex 
Boraine coincides with this view, saying that South Africans had to forge a 
common memory that everybody -from apartheid official supporters, anti-
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apartheid fighters, and the people who claimed ignorance of what was taking 
place in their own country- would recognize.81  
Not all societies that have undergone a violent period in their history 
have chosen to delve into their past though, including post-Franco Spain or 
Mozambique. Factors like political arrangements or fears of destabilizing the 
new order by reviving the memory of traumatic events may inhibit the 
establishment of truth commissions.82 Nevertheless, Paul van Zyl believes that 
when societies embark upon a truth telling process, they also initiate an 
important process of collective judgment, especially when accounts of human 
rights violations are delivered to society from an angle that motivates the 
condemnation of these violations. Apart from knowing about the human rights 
violations that happened in the past, he says, understanding why they are 
wrong is essential in order to prevent their recurrence.83 Scholars like Charles 
Maier, however, remain more skeptical about of the benefits that the truth of 
truth commissions can provide.  
Maier argues that the truth that comes from truth commissions cannot be 
history because truth commissions face significant challenges when gathering 
past accounts. He says that even though truth commissions want to collect a 
wide range of voices, the task of gathering stories should not be left in the 
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hands of a truth commission solely.84 Historians, for instance, have a duty to 
explore the array of options that were available to different sides in a conflict, 
making it more feasible to assign due responsibility. In his view, truth 
commissions are less likely to do so since they can be more focused on other 
goals (i.e. repentance, confession) than judgment or allocation of blame.85 For 
this reason, the findings of a truth commission, which are usually compiled in 
an official report, have to be seen as important pieces of a bigger whole, but 
never the unique narrative of the past.  
Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd, who were deeply 
involved in the writing of the South African TRC report, confirm the challenges 
that Maier refers to. They claim that in fact, putting together all the material that 
the Commission gathered was an undertaking of much complexity for a 
number of reasons. Although the TRC already precluded the inclusion of the 
voices of many victims of apartheid due to its ―narrow mandate and short life 
span‖, investigating all the atrocities that people denounced or including every 
one of their stories became an insurmountable task.86 For example, limited 
resources constrained the investigative capacity of the Commission, and the 
need to synthesize the large amount of information that was accumulated into a 
coherent and accessible reading material meant that only some accounts 
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registered in the official report.87 Moreover, even though the TRC held sectoral 
and institutional hearings to delve deeper into the role of a number of 
establishments during apartheid, Maier considers that the Commission could 
have not provided a complete picture of the past because that would have 
entailed concentrating much more on the institutions on which the apartheid 
regime rested.88  For all these reasons, Villa-Vicencio says that the limited scope 
of the TRC report calls onto journalists, politicians, writers and others to 
continue the work that the Commission started.89 His judgment of the report-
that it constitutes a roadmap which others can use- can be applied to truth 
commissions‘ reports in general. If this is the case, the weight of preventing 
conflict would spread out, and a truth commission would be treated as one 
body out of many in society carrying this weight. This idea is particularly 
relevant for this thesis because it brings up an aspect that is worth considering: 
to what extent can the TRC, as well as other truth commissions, be held 
accountable for issues that remain in their aftermath? Hugo van der Merwe‘s 
words resonate here: ―There is only so much that a truth commission can do.‖90 
Similar arguments are drawn around the restorative capacity of truth 
commissions.  
In societies emerging from divisive conflict, the need to restore the 
broken social fabric becomes crucial to establish some measure of stability. This 
need is directly related to restorative justice, which according to Jennifer 
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Llewellyn, is a theory of justice which ―[…] is concerned with restoring 
relationships harmed by wrongdoing to ones in which all parties enjoy and 
accord one another equal dignity, respect and concern.‖91 She explains that 
truth telling mechanisms may adopt restorative justice elements. For instance, 
the South African TRC a helpful model of what ―restorative justice-based 
institution‖ could look like. In her view, the following elements made up the 
restorative justice character of this truth commission in particular: the provision 
of amnesty to perpetrators; the opportunity that victims were given to tell their 
stories; the public nature of the process; and the forward-looking approach of 
the Commission.92 All of these elements made the TRC process more inclusive 
and allowed an opportunity to restore previously damaged social relations. At 
the same time, Llewellyn asserts that the TRC had limitations that might have 
diminished its restorative capacity, such as the fact that the cases of victims and 
perpetrators were dealt by different committees (the Human Rights Violations 
Committee for the former and the Amnesty Committee for the latter).  
Llewellyn argues that this arrangement is problematic from a restorative justice 
perspective. She says that there fewer chances of ―face-to-face‖ encounter 
between victims and perpetrators that could enable dialogue about past harms 
and measures of redress among them, which is considered to be an important 
step in restorative justice.93 In spite of this and other challenges that the TRC 
faced, the basic idea is that truth telling mechanisms have a restorative potential 
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because they can help set the ground for a future marked by different ways of 
relating to one another than in the past. Along this idea is that other 
assumptions emerge which associate truth telling with reconciliation and 
healing.  
 If promoting reconciliation and restoring dignity to victims rank high in 
the list of expectations, Martha Minow argues that truth commissions are better 
suited for the task than trials.94 Opposite to the retributive character that is more 
commonly present in the event of prosecutions, truth commissions promote 
values of compassion and peace, which are vital for stability.95 Indeed, many 
victims in South Africa expressed that the act of coming forward before the TRC 
and talking about their suffering helped them heal and move forward.  Some of 
them said that in some way, the public recognition of what they went through 
restored their dignity. 96 Alex Boraine classifies this as the healing and restorative 
truth, which involves disclosure and acknowledgment. In his view, ―deeply 
divided societies cannot rely on punishment to heal and to reconcile their 
several communities‖, whereas the exercise of truth telling can contribute to a 
healing process that might do so.97 Yet, this statement like a number of others 
need assessments to see whether truth commissions can in fact accomplish what 
is expected of them.  
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The preventive and restorative capacities of truth commissions, and the 
number of other assumptions that surround them, need to be tested in order to 
establish expectations that do match up to the real potential of this alternative 
mechanism of justice. Hayner says that most often, expectations are much 
greater than what truth commissions achieve in reality: ―Some of these 
expectations are simply not realistic in circumstances where there were 
thousands upon thousands of victims, where democratic institutions remain 
very weak, and where the will of perpetrators to express remorse or participate 
in reconciliatory exercises is tenuous, at best.‖98 Due to the prevalence of these 
grand assumptions, the real contributions of truth commissions are minimized 
and remain unappreciated.99 For this reason, the assessment literature needs to 
be strengthened to demystify the assumed capacities of truth telling processes 
so that a clearer picture of the benefits they do bring takes the forefront of 
discussions. 
The field of transitional justice, and truth commissions as one mechanism 
within this field, need more evaluation of their impact. In ―Assessing the 
Impact of Transitional Justice‖, van der Merwe et al. outline the many 
challenges that exist for empirical research, but also the necessity of establishing 
appropriate research methods that can demonstrate what transitional justice 
mechanisms accomplish. In regards to truth-telling processes, Tristan Borer 
identifies two main problems in the ‗assessment literature‘: the lack of 
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conceptual clarity and the conflation of ―aspiration with empiricism.‖100 First, 
she lists over twenty concepts that are associated with truth commissions, 
although how these concepts are in fact well-related to truth-telling processes 
and whether they can be realistically delivered remains to be studied.101 
Strongly related to this point is a second issue of assessment, which is what 
Borer describes as the problematic ―[…] phenomenon of equating ‗aspiration 
with empiricism.‖102 In other words, what often are no more than claims or 
unproven expectations about truth commissions eventually become facts. That 
truth heals, or that it leads to reconciliation, are statements that although time 
and again are linked to truth-telling processes, they nevertheless still need 
evaluation. 
The largely uncontested idea that truth fosters reconciliation has 
prompted the attention of some scholars. Hayner says: ―The goal of 
reconciliation has been so closely associated with some past truth commissions 
that many casual observers assume that reconciliation is an integral, or even 
primary, purpose of creating a truth commission, which is not always true.‖103 
Similarly, Robert Rotberg takes an issue with this loose association, arguing that 
it is an unproven assumption that reconciliation or restoration is attainable 
through the exercise of truth telling. Rotberg asks: ―does the truth commission 
method, with its transparency and attendant publicity, retard or advance the 
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process [of achieving reconciliation]?104 For instance, the very motto of the TRC, 
―Truth: the Road to Reconciliation‖, assumed a causal relationship. He says that 
the TRC functioned under the somewhat unchallenged conviction that 
reconciliation could be possible, ―…as if retelling the truth of the deepest 
machinations of apartheid-the culpability of its highest leaders and its mad-
doctor schemes of biological and chemical warfare- would somehow set South 
Africa free to forge a successful multiracial society.‖105 In this respect, Borer 
warns that evaluations of the success of the TRC on the basis of whether or not 
it fostered reconciliation among South Africans are problematic for two main 
reasons. First, the truth-reconciliation connection makes it seem as if 
reconciliation is the only way to measure success.106 Second, the very concept of 
reconciliation is not a conclusive one, because it can have multiple meanings.107  
The hypothesis of this thesis positions it within the assessment literature. 
The questions that motivate this research tackle the need of further research on 
impact of truth commissions –in this case, the TRC-that scholars refer to. Fifteen 
years after the end of apartheid, these questions are even timelier. Did the truth 
telling process of South Africa help to prevent the repetition of past abuses? 
More specifically, did it help to undermine the racism that characterized the 
past? Did the TRC establish a clean break from the regime that preceded the 
democratic order? Within this interrogatory framework, what should be clear is 
that the TRC, as other truth telling projects around the world, cannot be judged 
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as if it were the sole entity responsible of such a daunting task as pushing a 
whole country away from the horrors of the past. The TRC had the support of 
different elements in society, starting from the government, religious groups, 
and human rights activists among others, in carrying out its work. Yet, the 
visibility of the truth telling process was largely a function of the relentless 
attention that the media gave to it. For this reason, attention to how their work 
could have affected the process and the outcome of the TRC is important. A 
review of the literature on this aspect, the role of the media in a transitional 
justice context, is thus necessary.  
Media in Transitional Justice 
A key intervening variable of a truth telling process is how engaged the 
public is with it. Findings of a truth commission may or may not be made 
available to people in general, but in order to attain their goals, there is an 
underlying assumption that the information gathered at a truth commission 
should reach the widest possible audiences. In this respect, Lisa Laplante and 
Kelly Phenicie say that ―transitional justice projects inevitably rely on the media 
to reach their goals of disseminating the truth about a dark period of a 
country‘s history.‖108 Apart from the official report that a truth commission can 
release, the media109 have the power to bring people closer to the process by 
directing their attention to it. For this reason, the way newspapers, broadcasting 
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agencies and radio stations handle truth commission accounts and the events of 
truth-telling processes is crucial.  
In South Africa, the deep involvement of the media with the TRC has 
been regarded as a unique and vital aspect of the democratic transition. 
Accordingly, an assessment of the Commission‘s work will and perhaps should 
always consider the impact that media work could have had on the process, 
and this is true not only for the TRC but for other truth commissions as well. 
Thereby, this thesis will analyze the work of the Commission as the central 
establishment of the transitional justice period of South Africa, but will remain 
attentive to the large influence of the print media in this period to reach a more 
accurate conclusion. It should be noted that even though the connection 
between the media and transitional justice – and truth commissions specifically- 
seems obvious, there appears to be a lack of in-depth research on this 
connection.110 Not much work has been done concerning peace processes and 
the involvement of the media either.111 Nonetheless, for the research that has 
been done on these two related areas, the following themes are highlighted: the 
power of news framing, the possibilities of furthering peace, and the limitations 
of media in transitional justice schemes.  
Journalists choose the angle of framework of truth commissions‘ 
coverage, and these choices have implications on truth-telling processes that are 
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worth considering. Much of the weight of the relevance of the media comes 
from the power they possess when processing information. Tomas Nelson et al 
say that how readers respond to information transmitted to them is a function 
of framing, which is a ―…process by which a communication source, such as a 
news organization, defines and constructs a political issues or public 
controversy.‖112 Similarly, Gadi Wolfsfed states: ―The power of journalistic 
framing rests on the ‗social construction of reality theory‘, which posits that the 
meaning of events is not inherent in ‗a fundamentally ambiguous social world‘ 
but rather is created by the press.‖113 It is not a question of what events are told, 
but how they are told that can make a huge difference.114 This idea 
automatically places a fair amount of responsibility on journalists, because they 
are the ones who decide what aspects of a story to emphasize: ―…Journalists 
are responsible for not only reporting information, but also processing it, as 
opposed to leaving it in crude form.‖115 This is why Laplante argues that in 
some cases, the work of the media can be blamed for the deterioration or the 
advancement of a peace process. The continuity of conflict, she says, ―may be 
attributed, in part, to the media‘s failure to adequately mediate conflicting 
views of a country‘s history-its causes and consequences, its villains and 
heroes.‖116 In the same manner, Ellen and Daniel Yamshom stress the media‘s 
potential in fulfilling the goal of reconciliation that some truth commissions aim 
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for.117 Although truth commissions bear the main task of mediating the 
different accounts and demands of people in the aftermath of conflict, Laplante 
says that the configuration of a ―collective memory‖ requires the involvement 
of the media ―to encourage consensus-making about the past.‖118 In fact, 
Escudero Scott et al regard the media as ―the chief cultural guardians of 
national memories‖, which is one reason they are invariably related to truth 
commissions in their pursuit of putting the past on record.119  
While media outlets might promote values that could serve the goals of 
transitional justice mechanisms, they are still limited by a number of important 
factors. According to Wolfsfed, the press can establish the character of a 
national debate by emphasizing certain ideas and arguments. News headlines 
and slogans, as carriers of ideologies, can affect people‘s perception on an 
issue.120 Popular images of the enemy can be altered to change the public‘s 
opinion and to mobilize for peace rather than war.121 This could also necessitate 
change in the way the media work. Laplante suggests that journalists need to be 
trained to frame the news in a way that will serve the purpose of transitional 
justice scheme. 122 If the goal is to disseminate the idea that human rights 
violations are wrong, for instance, then the media ought to know how to convey 
this message with their choice of news angle. At the same time, the media have 
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to convey their stories in a simple manner sometimes, which makes it harder to 
portray the complexity of a conflict. Wolfsfed says that for issues of timing and 
space, journalists need to build their stories on ―short and uncomplicated‖ 
storylines. He adds, ―The news media are more likely to cover personalities 
than institutions, to prefer good visuals over complex texts, and to deal with 
specific opinions rather than general ideologies.‖123 This is particularly 
problematic for truth commissions, especially if they want to paint a complete 
and complex picture of the past. Neglecting the larger issues that lurk behind 
particular events risks over-simplification and misunderstanding on the part of 
the audience. In addition to this, Laplante explains how the journalistic value of 
neutrality may run counter to transitional justice aims.  ―[…] When a society 
needs a new direction in public discourse, […] merely ‗reporting what each side 
says‘ does not always ensure a fruitful discussion that leads to the 
establishment of a collective memory and national reconciliation.‖124 Of crucial 
importance is also the fact that sometimes the media are in a dual position 
within the transitional justice process itself. ―The media,‖ Laplante says, ―[are] 
both direct actor(s) in transitional justice and its subject(s).‖125 This statement 
resonates with particular strength when looking at the stance of the media 
during apartheid and the TRC process, an aspect that will be crucial to 
understand the criticism about the media in the transitional justice period.  
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As this chapter has sketched out some of the most important arguments 
surrounding transitional justice mechanisms, the role of truth commissions and 
the impact of the media in these contexts, it becomes clearer why some scholars 
call for further assessment in light of contemporary events. Before turning to 
the main analytical goal of this thesis, an exploration of the political 
negotiations that contributed to the demise of apartheid will follow. 
Understanding the compromises that had to be made in the run-up to the 
elections in 1994 is important because these compromises shaped the 
transitional justice process to a great extent. This examination will be the first 
step to learn why the TRC worked the way it did specifically, and where much 
of the criticism of its work comes from. 
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“…I do not believe a truth commission should take political decisions. If that is the intention, it is doomed 
to lack credibility from the start. I do not believe that any court, be it a truth commission, court of law, 
any judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, can define its own terms of reference. These have to be 
determined by the politicians, who may find it easy, perhaps tempting, not to take difficult and unpopular 
decisions. However, these are decisions that have to be taken even before a truth commission or any other 
process can get under way.”126 
 
 
 
rior to the end of apartheid, a number of political leaders and civil 
society organizations began to envision the need to put South 
Africa on the path towards a transitional justice process. Although the 
democratic elections of 1994 would mark the demise of the racist regime, many 
challenges lay before and after this remarkable event. Inevitably, the task of 
bridging the divide of a ruptured society would require extensive negotiations. 
Hence, the question was: how could South Africans overcome the legacy of 
apartheid and learn to coexist in a peaceful democratic environment? It was 
argued that a decisive break from the former order was an essential step for the 
emergence of a culture of human rights. A consensus in favor of establishing a 
transitional justice mechanism that could put society on a sound moral 
foundation began to emerge. The premise of the proposal for transitional 
justice, as Guillermo O‘Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter have argued, is that a 
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society will not be able to progress if it does not somehow tackle the 
wrongdoings of the past.127  
The perception that all South Africans, irrespective of their allegiances, 
needed to examine their past deepened. Eventually, it became clearer that there 
would be no chance of a peaceful democratic establishment if apartheid leaders 
did not participate of the process leading towards that outcome; ―A peaceful 
transition followed by a democratic order would not have been possible if the 
former apartheid leaders did not actively play a role in creating this new 
order.‖128  As a result, the question of justice and reconciliation was at the center 
of many debates during the political negotiations that brought apartheid to its 
end. Ultimately, political leaders and civil society groups decided that a truth 
commission would be the most appropriate mechanism of transitional justice 
for South Africa. In order to understand their decision, an examination of the 
circumstances under which apartheid came to an end is necessary.  
The Negotiated End of Apartheid 
The end of apartheid was the product of years of negotiations between 
the government, led by the National Party (NP), and anti-apartheid liberation 
movements, the most prominent of which was the African National Congress 
(ANC). Secret talks between government officials and Nelson Mandela had 
already begun back in the mid-1980s when he was still a political prisoner at 
Robben Island.129 Nevertheless, it would not be until F.W. De Klerk became 
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President in 1989 that the course of the talks took a major shift. On 2 February 
1990, De Klerk declared that the banning orders on the ANC and other political 
parties would be lifted. At some point later when commenting on this historical 
event, he would confess that he did not proceed to unban the political parties 
because he had come to finally acknowledge the regime‘s unfairness. Instead, 
he did so purely on pragmatic grounds. He realized that apartheid was no 
longer workable and that dismantling it would actually serve the interests of his 
party better. ―It was not a question of morality‖, he said, ―but of practical 
politics.‖130 Beyond the question of whether or not De Klerk acted out of moral 
enlightenment or opportunistic impulse, the release of Mandela became a 
memorable moment in the history of South Africa. On 11 February 1990, 
millions of people around the world watched this remarkable political leader of 
the anti-apartheid struggle walk out of prison after twenty seven years of 
imprisonment. 131 An era of political negotiations was about to begin.  
A number of factors propelled the decision of the apartheid government 
to enter negotiations with the liberation forces. Apart from mounting 
international criticism of the apartheid regime, growing economic isolation and 
global geopolitical changes such as the fall of the Berlin Wall gave the De Klerk 
impetus to engage in more sweeping political reforms.132 Particularly, with the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc, the alleged ‗communist threat‘ vanished, so the 
National Party could no longer defend their actions by accusing the resistance 
movement of trying to impose a communist regime in South Africa. At the 
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same time, Allister Sparks says that De Klerk did not envision how negotiations 
with the ANC and other major parties of the resistance would pave the way for 
black-majority rule. Sparks affirms that ―…De Klerk did not expect his reforms 
to lead to black-majority rule ―, and that in fact, he did not foresee ―the end of 
Afrikaner nationalism before the end of the decade.‖ 133 If anything, he expected 
a ―power-sharing‖ arrangement with members of the liberation forces in which 
whites would still retain most power.134 Once the negotiations began, however, 
he had to face the uncontainable political determination of the ANC, and how 
this determination would limit the power of the NP tremendously.135 Yet, the 
government was also resolute to keep its grip on power, so De Klerk developed 
concepts around minority rights and demanded a system of enforced-
coalitions.136 This and other demands had their weight, because in reality the 
government was not defeated militarily nor fully vanquished politically. This 
meant that the NP still possessed considerable political leverage and could 
affect the outcome of the negotiations that led to the first democratic elections.  
The ANC found itself in a complex position during the negotiations, 
since it had to deal with the same leaders who upheld a regime that the party 
fought against for decades. At the most basic level, while NP leaders had to 
acknowledge that their party could no longer sustain white-minority rule, 
particularly in the face of economic stagnation and intensified international 
condemnation of the oppressive regime, the ANC had to accept the somewhat 
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heavier fact that the government would not lose full control of the state at least 
for five years. This acceptance was reflected in various concessions, particularly 
in the provision of a ‗sunset clause‘, and the temporary establishment of 
multiparty government coalition known as ―Government of National Unity‖ 
(GNU), both of which will be further detailed below. Discussions on 
appropriate mechanisms of justice also took into account the implications of the 
position of the NP in the transition.  
At a ―Justice in Transition‖ conference held in 1994 by the Institute for a 
Democratic South Africa (Idasa), Dumisa Ntsebeza –a future TRC 
Commissioner - reminded the attendants that ―…the government is not a 
vanquished enemy. It is in power and still has armed forces in place.‖137 This 
conference drew South African academics and experts from countries such as 
Chile, Argentina and Bulgaria to discuss the possible ways South Africa could 
deal with the legacy of apartheid.138 Any choice of a transitional justice 
mechanism to address the past would be influenced by the very ones who 
would most likely be the subjects of this mechanism. In the words of Tristan 
Borer, ―The implications of having to keep the National Party on-board and 
having to work side by side with those most likely to come under purview of 
any mechanism for political justice was simple: the necessity of a high degree of 
compromise in the development of such a mechanism.‖139 The provision of 
amnesty in the post-amble of the Constitution was a notable example of a 
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fundamental compromise, which was made in order to carry the negotiations 
forwards and assure the democratic elections, but other compromises also took 
place at different stages during the negotiations. 
On the contentious issue of who should be part of the negotiations, it was 
Mandela who put forward the ambitious proposal of having a convention of all 
political organizations- later known as the Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa (CODESA). In it, leaders of all parties negotiated the core contents of an 
interim Constitution. The multiparty convention was significant because the 
groundwork that would alter the injustices of apartheid would be lain in there. 
In a sense, the very future of the democratic order of South Africa was at stake 
throughout CODESA, as well as the real potential to transform the status quo of 
a racially divided society. For these reasons, the process was marred with 
tension and distrust from every side, since party leaders were well-aware of the 
importance of every decision they arrived at.140 Moreover, deep-seated 
disagreements among them surfaced, to the point of disrupting the flow of the 
negotiations often. These disagreements became particularly relevant in 1993.  
At the time, the ANC and the NP were divided over what type of system 
would be the best to allocate power to parties in government. The NP 
advocated for ―power-sharing‖, an arrangement that which subject the 
decisions of the ANC or any other major party in Parliament to the veto power 
of minority parties such as the NP. Not surprisingly, ANC leaders strongly 
disagreed with this arrangement because it would essentially keep the political 
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establishment of apartheid intact.141 ―The power of no,‖ comments Allister 
Sparks, ―would remain in the hands of the old oligarchy […]The apartheid 
thinkers had come a long way, but they were still not quite free of their 
ideological mindset […]Now that they were having to go the whole hog and 
grant universal franchise, they were still trying to ensure that whites could 
protect the status quo by vetoing black decisions.‖142 Negotiations were stalled 
around this issue, proof of the complexity of elaborating the interim 
Constitution. Yet, negotiations needed to go on, and the issue of power 
allocation had to be resolved to assure the realization of the democratic 
elections.  
At this critical juncture, a ‗sunset clause‘ proposed by Joe Slovo, then 
head of the South African Communist Party (SACP), managed to break the 
political deadlock that was keeping the process from moving forward.  This 
clause conceded to the NP‘s demand of establishing a power-sharing cabinet for 
the period that would follow after the adoption of a new Constitution.143 
According to it, the cabinet would be subject to proportional representation in 
the executive.144 At the same time, the job positions of a predominantly 
Afrikaner civil service, the police and the military were guaranteed for five 
years.145 However, in order to ensure that this arrangement would not hinder 
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the possibility of new developments in the democratic regime, the sunset clause 
was set to remain only for the five-year period. No veto power was granted to 
minority parties.146 By CODESA‘s end, it was decided that the country would 
be governed by a power-sharing arrangement, named the Government of 
National Unity (GNU), which would stay in place until 1999.147 
When presenting his formula, Slovo made a point of stating what was a 
fact: The expectation that NP officials, who still held power, would easily 
surrender to the demands of the liberation movements were not realistic.148 
Echoing the comments of others, he said: ―We [are] clearly not dealing with a 
defeated enemy.‖149 The balance of political forces during the negotiations 
made compromises of this kind realistically necessary, he suggested. In his 
view, negotiations were not the justice end, but the means to justice, a ‗stage‘ in 
the process of achieving a better and more legitimate position inside 
government than the one the ANC and others held of that moment: 
―Negotiations are only a part, and not the whole, of the struggle for real 
people‘s power.‖150  As much as Slovo‘s proposal was strategically necessary, 
the deal ensured that the bureaucracy of the old regime remained intact, 
however. In other words, key privileges that apartheid conceded to whites 
would be unchallenged for a period of time. A similar compromise of the 
negotiated settlement was the provision of amnesty to perpetrators of political 
crimes.  
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On Amnesty 
The question of how to deal with the legacy of apartheid was raised 
throughout the course of the negotiations repeatedly. The demand for amnesty 
for political crimes committed during apartheid was directly correlated to this 
question, and it was one of the most difficult issues to resolve. In spite of the 
great deal of controversy that the issue produced and the rejection of some 
victims towards the very proposal151, amnesty was guaranteed in the interim 
Constitution in a post-amble, which reads as follows: 
―This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a 
deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering 
and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, 
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for 
all South Africans, irrespective of color, race, class, belief or sex.  
The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens 
and peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and 
the reconstruction of society.  
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall 
be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with 
political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the 
past. . . . ―152 
According to then Justice Minister Dullah Omar, amnesty was the inevitable 
price for securing a peaceful transition.153 In reality, however, the insertion of 
the clause did not occur without a great deal of contention and an exhaustive 
search for consensus among the negotiating parties of the Constitution.  
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In 1992, negotiations were stalled due to the government‘s proposal of 
granting general amnesty to members of the security forces and the liberation 
movements. 154 Yet, this proposal per se was not the main source of strain during 
the negotiations. It was instead the NP‘s unilateral introduction of amnesty 
legislation that became problematic. The NP, acting out of growing pressure 
from right-wing elements and the security forces, passed the Further Indemnity 
Act in spite of strong opposition from the ANC and other parties. This Act 
granted the President the power to pardon any crime that was politically 
motivated, and hence eroded the possibility of punishing apartheid 
perpetrators for their actions.155 The Act provided that ultimately, the State 
President could provide indemnity to ―the perpetrators of acts with a political 
object advised, directed, commanded, ordered or performed…before 12:00 on 8 
October 1990.‖156 Even though the preceding 1990 Indemnity Act, which spelled 
out the terms under which liberators could receive indemnity and that had been 
worked out by the ANC and government members, De Klerk sought to pass a 
clause that would effectively rule out punitive trials. The liberation parties 
condemned the government‘s action accordingly. Louren Du Plessis captures 
this issue: ―The government acted unilaterally and did not consult any of its 
major negotiating partners. This was in marked contrast to the culture of 
negotiation and consultation which characterized the adoption and 
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implementation of the 1990 Indemnity Act.‖157 Although the 1992 Act caused 
much resentment, it became the foundation for the provision of amnesty that 
was included in the post-amble of the Constitution. The adoption of amnesty 
had a direct effect on the subsequent transitional justice process. At the same 
time, the establishment of punitive trials was also grounded in political, moral 
and legal assessments.  
The Origins of the South African Truth Commission 
The ANC had already set a remarkable precedent before the official 
establishment of the South African truth commission. In 1993, the Motsuenyane 
Commission of Enquiry –an ANC-led commission tasked with investigating 
accusations of human rights violations inside ANC training camps in exile– 
concluded that gross violations of human rights had been committed by a 
number of ANC members. In an outstanding move, the National Executive 
Committee (NEC) of the ANC accepted the findings of the Commission‘s report 
in public, and it expressed a deep sense of collective moral responsibility and 
guilt for all those who suffered for the transgressions.158 This event was a 
historical milestone, as never before had a liberation movement held its own 
members to account for human rights violations.159 In fact, according to Johnny 
de Lange, the Motsuenyane Commission should be seen as part of the overall 
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process of dealing with the country‘s past and achieving reconciliation.160 It was 
from the process and the result of this Commission of Enquiry that the ANC 
made a request to the government to establish a commission to deal with the 
violations that took place in the country during apartheid. 
The ANC-NEC, in responding to the report of the Montsuenyane 
Commission, specified that a commission should be charged with the task of 
looking at all the abuses of human rights that took place under apartheid.161  
The NEC outlined the reasons behind its proposal for a truth commission, one 
of which was the successful record of Latin American countries that had had 
truth commissions:  
―The most important reason for the establishment of such a commission 
is to get to the truth. The experience of Chile, Argentina and El Salvador 
keenly reflects the cleaning power of the truth. Thousands of people who 
gave evidence rarely, if ever, showed a desire for vengeance. What 
mattered to most was that the memory of their loved ones would not be 
denigrated or forgotten and that such terrible things never happen 
again.‖162 
The NEC suggested that perpetrators within the ANC ranks should be dealt 
with alongside other transgressors.163 Many believe that Kader Asmal had an 
influential role in the drafting of the proposal of a commission of inquiry for the 
ANC, and that he was the first one to put forward the idea of confronting the 
past. In 1992, at a university lecture, he noted the idea of having a ―conscious 
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understanding of the past‖ in order to look to the future.164 In parallel, civil 
society groups also took up the debate of how to deal with South Africa‘s past.  
 The ongoing talks between South African activists, experts, and 
international advisors led towards a consensus that a truth commission should 
be established in South Africa. For this matter, the Institute for a Democratic 
South Africa (IDASA) was at the vanguard of a series of events set up for the 
purpose of searching an agreement on the most appropriate transitional justice 
mechanism. Under the auspices of this institute, in 1992 a group of South 
Africans went to Eastern Europe to learn how these countries were facing the 
challenges of their political transitions.165 Alex Boraine, then head of IDASA, 
later met with experts like Lawrence Weschler who were working in the field of 
transitional justice. In these occasions, he was particularly moved by Weschler‘s 
accounts of the cases of Brazil and Uruguay; ―His book A Miracle, a Universe: 
Settling Accounts with Torturers…was of enormous inspiration in contemplating 
our situation in South Africa‖, Boraine has said.166 Following these events and 
bearing in mind the added pressure of the fast approaching 1994 elections, two 
conferences were held in South Africa to debate the subject of justice.  
The inputs of lawyers, human rights activists, and Eastern European and 
Latin American distinguished intellectuals, among others, served to further 
cement the agreement that there was a pressing need to look at the human 
rights violations that took place in the past. However, only after the elections, 
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the consensus reached at the conferences translated into official petitions to the 
new government for a truth commission.167 In a letter written to Nelson 
Mandela only weeks after the elections, Alex Boraine outlined the reasons for 
the establishment of a truth commission. He finalized the letter by saying that 
only through―…the knowledge and awareness of [the] violations, the dealing 
with them in terms of acknowledgment and compensation to victims and 
possible prosecutions of some of the perpetrators could well assist in ensuring 
that the long years of apartheid will never occur again in South Africa.‖168 With 
Mandela‘s support for the proposal, the next and most significant step in 
formalizing a South African truth commission was taken up by Parliament. This 
was a remarkable development because the constitutional provision of amnesty 
did not require the set up of a truth commission. In other words, amnesty could 
have been granted without the establishment of a truth-telling process. The 
post-amble of the Constitution did not impose disclosure of truth as a condition 
for receiving this provision. Therefore, that the truth commission of South 
Africa had the power to mediate this provision, binding it to full disclosure of 
the facts about breaches committed in the past, set it apart from previous truth 
commissions.  
The Mandate of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
The new South African Parliament, through the 1995 Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act no. 34, created the South African Truth 
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and Reconciliation Commission. In his presentation of the draft Act to 
Parliament, Minister of Justice Dullah Omar began his speech as follows: 
―I have the privilege and responsibility to introduce today a Bill which 
provides a pathway, a stepping stone, towards the historic bridge of 
which the Constitution speaks whereby our society can leave behind the 
past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold 
suffering and injustice, and commence the journey towards a future 
founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful 
coexistence, and development opportunities for all South Africans 
irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.  
 
Its substance is the very essence of the constitutional commitment to 
reconciliation and the reconstruction of society. Its purpose is to provide 
that secure foundation which the Constitution enjoins: ‗…for the people 
of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which 
generated gross human rights violations…and a legacy of hatred, fear, 
guilt and revenge‘. ―169 
 
 The Minister‘s opening words put stress on the intent of institutionalizing what 
the interim Constitution mandated. This Act would provide the platform of the 
TRC‘s work.  
Parliament vested the TRC with the task of fostering the reconciliation 
and national unity enshrined in the post-amble of the interim Constitution. It is 
important to note though that the TRC was not the only institution charged 
with this mission. Other institutions such as the Land Claims Court, the 
Constitutional Court, the Human Rights, the Gender and the Youth 
Commissions were also conceived within a framework that stressed the 
promotion of national unity and reconciliation in the new South Africa.170 
Another aspect to consider is that the proposal of setting up a truth commission 
was not necessarily new or unfamiliar, as previously discussed, and neither was 
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it set up without the formal objections of some prominent members of 
society.171  
The Act delineated the Commission‘s work in various ways. It outlined 
its major goals, which in summary were:  to determine a complete picture of the 
causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights between 
March 1, 1960 and May 10, 1994; to facilitate the granting of amnesty to 
perpetrators of crimes who came forward and disclosed the whole truth about 
their acts while providing victims with a chance to share their stories; to 
prepare a final report with all the findings of the Commission with 
recommendations to prevent future human rights violations.172 The 
Commission had to complete its work in eighteen months beginning in 
December 15, 1995. 173 It was composed of seventeen commissioners, each of 
whom was appointed by the President, with the chairmanship and vice-
chairmanship of Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Alex Boraine respectively.174 
Three committees -the Human Rights Violations Committee, the Committee on 
Amnesty and the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation of Victims-were 
established to fulfill the goals of the Commission. As noted in Chapter 1, 
concepts contained in the Act, such the terms ‗human rights violations‘, 
‗victims‘ and ‗perpetrators‘ were the subject of intense debate and deep 
contestation, and Commisioners had to put up with the challenge of putting 
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them into actual practice.175 The implications of these terms are a central aspect 
of analysis in this thesis. How could this language of ‗victims‘ and 
‗perpetrators‘ have impinged on the goal of reconciliation that the mandate had 
established? Before this question is taken into account and an examination of 
the critiques to the TRC and the media are outlined, the content of the main 
language of the Commission needs to be lay out.  
Terminology of the TRC 
 Violations of Human Rights 
The task of investigating and condemning actions that the Act identified 
as violations of human rights posed some important challenges to the 
Commission. Commissioners argued that the lack of clarity of some of the 
terminology in the Act put limitations in their work. A gross violation of human 
right was one such term. The Act established the following definition: 
―…‘gross violation of human rights‘ means the violation of human rights 
through-(a) the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill treatment of any 
person; or (b) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command 
or procurement to commit an act referred to in paragraph (a), which 
emanated from conflicts of the past and which was committed during the 
period 1 March 1960 to 10 May 1994 within or outside the Republic, and 
the commission of which was advised, planned, directed, commanded or 
ordered, by any person acting with a political motive (section 1(1)(ix).‖ 
176 
 
Commissioners argued that the Act could have been more precise or clearer in 
this area.177 For instance, determining what acts had a clearly ‗political motive‘ 
was difficult to assess. They said that it was hard to establish the most 
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appropriate criteria for classifying an action as strictly political because of the 
very nature of apartheid: ―Given the complexity of the conflicts that occurred in 
the past and the fact that the enforcement of apartheid legislation affected every 
sphere of society, the political nature of specific acts was hard to define.‖178 
Hence, one of the most urgent tasks on the agenda of the Commission was to 
resolve what constituted a politically motivated act and what did not. 
Eventually, the Commission decided to narrow the understanding of political 
acts down to ―…any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or 
procurement to commit an act‖, and it was a decision largely informed by the 
Noorgard Principles.179 These principles, which were elaborated by the 
president of the European Commission on Human Rights Carl Aage Norgaard 
at the time of the Namibian settlement in 1978,180 included the following 
conditions to determine the political nature of an act:  
―the motive of the person who committed the act; the context in which 
the act took place; the legal and factual nature of the act; the object of the 
act; whether the act was carried out on the orders of a body of which the 
perpetrator was a member; and the closeness of the connection between 
the act and the objective pursued.‖181 
 
As much as the definition of human rights violations posed some challenges to 
the Commission, so did the ‗victim/perpetrator‘ binary.  
 Victims & Perpetrators 
The subjects of the Commission, as stated in the language of the Act, 
were victims and perpetrators of the actions that constituted gross violations of 
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human rights. Nevertheless, Commissioners recognized that the terms victims 
and perpetrators had relevant limitations and problematic paradoxes. In this 
respect, Borer has elaborated extensively on the issues attached to the 
somewhat simplistic ‗victim/perpetrator‘ binary. She has said that in reality, 
differences between these two groups were not necessarily as clear-cut, and that 
the ―homogeneity that [was] often assumed to individuals within each group 
[has been] overstated.‖182 In what concerns to the term ‗victims‘, at the most 
basic level, they were those individuals against whom any of the violations 
were committed.183 If a person had undergone torture or persecution during the 
time period established in the Act, then that person could come forward and 
testify to the Commission. However, this concept did not necessarily match the 
perceptions or the ideas of those who were labeled as such. The TRC Report 
states that ―…many described as victims might better be described, and indeed, 
might prefer to be described as survivors.‖184 Particularly, some of those who 
actively fought in the struggle against apartheid felt uncomfortable with the 
‗victim‘ label. 
In spite of its issues, the Commission ended up applying the term of 
victim as it was handed down to it by the mandate, limiting it even further to a 
closed-list of persons who could qualify for compensation. Only individuals 
who approached the Commission and fit the category of victim or those who 
did so on behalf of other victims, or if their names came up during the amnesty 
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process were included in the closed-list of victims.185 The issues that this 
particular term engendered were (and have been) as much the subject of 
criticism of the TRC‘s work as were the implications of the concept of 
‗perpetrator‘. 
Problematic as the term was, the Commission used the term ‗perpetrator‘ 
when referring to those who could be held accountable for committing any 
violation of human rights motivated for political reasons. By mandate, the 
Commission had to identify all the persons who perpetrated human rights 
abuses with an exclusively political aim regardless of their backgrounds. 
Commissioners admitted that they used this term with unease. The label 
‗perpetrator‘ by itself made no distinction of context or the backdrop against 
which some actions were committed in the first place.186 In fact, this was one of 
the primary reasons why the ANC expressed discomfort with the work of the 
TRC: ―At the core of the ANC‘s anger and disagreement with the TRC was the 
government‘s perception that the TRC was not properly distinguishing between 
the morality of the violence perpetrated by the state versus the that of 
perpetrators fighting against the state.‖187 According to the ANC, in trying to 
stay neutral when allocating responsibility, the TRC risked failing to 
acknowledge the structural factors that motivated the engagement in violent 
struggle on the part of the liberation movements. The Commission‘s response to 
this challenge was that even for just causes, unjust deeds might be carried 
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out.188 Nevertheless, a perception of overall failure to acknowledge the bigger 
picture of apartheid, and the alleged repercussions of such failure on race 
relations specifically, has given substance to the critiques of the TRC which will 
be discussed in the next pages.  
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The TRC and Race 
Race, the most distinguishable element of apartheid, was a complex 
subject for the TRC to grapple with. Due to decades of racial classification and 
segregation, race relations in South Africa were under much strain after the 
1994 elections. The task of improving this state of affairs seemed immediate, 
and in many ways the TRC appeared as one mechanism that would help 
overcome the racist legacy of apartheid. Nevertheless, people‘s views and the 
sentiments about the work of the Commission and its handling of the race issue 
have been rather varied. For instance, according to Desmond Tutu, some people 
perceived that the truth-telling process that the Commission initiated was in 
fact detrimental to the state of race relations in the country and the greater goal 
of reconciliation.189 In the foreword of the final report of the TRC, Tutu 
commented on this perception: ―Some have been upset by the suggestion that 
the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission could have resulted in 
making people angrier and race relations more difficult, as indicated by a recent 
survey.‖190 In this respect, scholars like Mahmood Mamdani and Brandon 
Hamber, among others, have put forward arguments that aim to prove how the 
limitations of the TRC have had an impact on reconciliation and racial relations 
in South Africa. 
Mamdani has argued that the TRC‘s scope of work was too narrow and 
that for this reason, it did not strike at the core issues of apartheid, which were 
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mainly structural. In failing to include ‗beneficiaries‘ of apartheid -those who 
did not necessarily engage in human rights violations considered by the 
Commission but still bore some responsibility- and the large majority of 
victims, he says, reconciliation was impinged.191 In more direct reference to the 
issue of racism, Brandon Hamber says, ―Through the failure of the TRC to 
address structural issues, it was inevitable that in the post-TRC period, the 
inequalities of the past and their racial flavor would loom large-as indeed they 
do.‖192 Thus, racial relations remain largely problematic today. Scholars like 
James Gibson, however propose an alternative view and consider that the TRC 
fulfilled its role dutifully and that the Commission‘s work did in fact contribute 
to improving racial relations.193 Before this debate is analyzed in detail, 
however, it is important to note that if there is agreement that the TRC had to 
lay the groundwork for ‗reconciliation and national unity‘,194  there is still 
disagreement over what reconciliation should entail. In effect, different 
understandings of reconciliation complicate views of the impact of the TRC on 
racism in South Africa. Whether the Commission could in any way be held 
responsible for either deteriorated or improved race relations is also a function 
of what concept of reconciliation one is looking at. For this thesis though, the 
aspect of reconciliation that will figure more prominently is that of racial 
reconciliation. Given that apartheid sought division through racism, then 
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reconciliation, as Gibson suggests, must happen among these races. 
Interestingly, by mandate the Commission could not deal with racism per se, 
even though it was the founding ideology of the system of apartheid.  
The scope of human rights violations in the TRC‘s mandate limited the 
Commission in its treatment of racism. Commissioners argued that that they 
had to abide by the terms of inquiry that their mandate delineated, terms that in 
some ways ruled out attempting to denounce or solve purely racist issues.195 In 
the Commission‘s report, the recognition of this limitation is made explicit in 
several instances. Under the topic of ‗Racism‘, Commissioners explained how 
they were constrained to act when people brought forward problems with 
racism.196 For instance, on several occasions, individuals were victims of racist 
attacks at the hands of people who were not necessarily tied to a particular 
political organization or political ideology. Yet, the Commission could not take 
these cases into consideration because the Act only took issue with abuses that 
had a specific political intent or motif. The final report notes: ―Although racism 
was at the heart of the South African political order, and although such cases 
were clearly a violation of a victim‘s rights, such violations did not fall within 
the Commission‘s work.‖197 At the same time, racism was taken into account in 
those cases that seemed to fall under the purview of the mandate of the 
Commission, as it was with the cases where racism and political ideology were 
closely intertwined: ―Instances where racism was used to mobilize people 
through a political organization as part of their commitment to a political 
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struggle or where racism was used by a political organization to incite other to 
violence.‖198 Killings of white farmers by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) or 
the ANC, and violence against Blacks by right-wing organizations, were some 
examples of such instances when racism was visibly guiding political actions.199 
In general though, Tutu reaffirmed that racism was the common element of the 
human rights violations that the Commission scrutinized. In fact, he said that 
the majority of those who perpetrated these violations were defending 
apartheid.200 Madeleine Fullard and Nahla Valji, however, believe that much 
more could have been done to deal with the race problem of apartheid by the 
TRC. They argue that the Commission failed to address the issue of racism in its 
work properly, and that in doing so an opportunity was missed to improve the 
state of race relations in South Africa.201 James Gibson, however, asserts that the 
Commission‘s approach to racism was appropriate and that it actually fostered 
better racial relations today.  
Gibson has done quantitative analysis to demonstrate that TRC played 
an enabling role that eased racial tensions and helped lay the groundwork for 
improved racial relations in contemporary South Africa. In his view, an 
important aspect of the reconciliation that the TRC was meant to bring about 
was racial reconciliation.202 If apartheid divided people along racial categories 
and exacerbated hostilities among these clearly defined racial groups, then 
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logically reconciliation must happen primarily between these groups. ―In South 
Africa,‖ says Gibson, ―the groups that must reconcile are the four main racial 
groups in the country-whites, Africans, Coloured people, and South Africans of 
Asian origin.‖203 Ideally, if reconciliation has been achieved, these groups 
should see and treat each other as equal and with respect and dignity. 204 In 
theory, Gibson has argued a minimization of racial animosities would entail 
higher levels of interaction among people from different races, as well as more 
communication coupled with greater understanding and acceptance of distinct 
racial groups. If these elements are present, they would ultimately lead to an 
embrace of racial diversity and multiculturalism. 205 In his analysis, Gibson has 
contended that the nature of the work of the TRC enabled the emergence of 
these attitudes, thus contributing to racial reconciliation.  
Gibson has argued that the non-biased, even-handed treatment of the 
gross violations of human rights that the TRC dealt with fostered racial 
reconciliation. In his view, the fact that the Commission acknowledged that 
people from every side perpetrated violations during the struggle against 
apartheid is what helped to defy racial boundaries. In other words, if what most 
people knew about apartheid was what the ‗other‘ had done, the Commission 
challenged people‘s prejudices by virtue of its work. He says, ―To get South 
Africans to change their attitudes toward those of other racial groups, it is 
essential that the cognitive basis of racial beliefs be shaken up… How might the 
truth and reconciliation process have created this dissonance? Perhaps the most 
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important lesson of the TRC was that both sides in the struggle did horrible 
things.‖206 According to Gibson, the fact that the violations committed by the 
South African Police Force and the ANC were equally condemned was a step 
forward in demystifying ideas of those in different racial groups bringing 
people closer together.  
Similarly, the Commission had to take into account that as much as there 
were perpetrators of gross violations of human rights in every group, there 
were also victims on every side. In relation to this, Commissioners explain that 
they had to apply an even-handed treatment to victims of human rights 
violations due to the terms of the founding Act. According to the report: ―The 
Commission was obliged by statute to deal even-handedly with all victims. Its 
actions when dealing with individual victims were guided, amongst other 
things, by the principle that ‗victims shall be treated equally without 
discrimination of any kind‘ (section 11 (b)). In so doing, it acknowledged the 
tragedy of human suffering wherever it occurred.‖207 In Gibson‘s view, it is 
precisely this neutral approach to human rights violations that has increased 
the likelihood of lasting reconciliation because it has given Blacks and whites 
the chance to see a more accurate picture of the reality of apartheid.208 Other 
scholars, however, have looked at the TRC‘s alleged neutrality towards the 
violations it handled with unease, and have challenged the argument that the 
Commission‘s approach was the most appropriate one.  
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Critics like Valji and Fullard argue that the TRC downplayed the role of 
racism in understanding the violations of human rights that came under the 
purview of its work. According to Valji, Commissioners treated racism and 
politics separately rather than as strongly related. She says that race was only 
explicitly addressed in the TRC process when it was used as a mobilizing tool 
of a political organization, which is a fair statement in light of Tutu‘s 
recognition of the instances when race came up in the work of the Commission 
as an issue to be dealt with. Valji argues that this approach to race is 
problematic because it served to disguise essentially racist acts behind the 
‗political‘ label.209 Similarly, Fullard considers that political and ideological 
affiliations mattered more to the TRC than people‘s racial identities and how 
these identities affected their lives.210 She says, ―Race and racism were de-
centered as a critical interrogational framework for the TRC, along with several 
other key constitutive elements of the parameters of apartheid, including class, 
gender and ethnicity.‖211 Furthermore, Valji argues that throughout the process 
victims were forced to concentrate on the most important details of their stories 
and were discouraged from narrating everyday events of racial 
discrimination.212 In a similar line, Willhelm Verdoolaege states: ―Stories were 
circumscribed and crafted through a variety of means, including pre-rehearsing 
of those who were to tell their stories publicly, the controlling of testimonies in 
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the public arena using uniform questions and interruptions where witnesses 
strayed from expected testimony into unanticipated topics.‖213 As for the report, 
the topic of racism is minimally discussed and limited to a couple of pages. 
Posel says that racism figures more ―as an answer, and not a question [...] 
Racism simply exists. Overall, there is little sense of interconnectedness of 
racism and other divides in the society.‖214 In Mamdani‘s view, the categories of 
‗victims‘ and ‗perpetrators‘ misrepresented the reality of apartheid.  
Mamdani has pointed out that the truth that came out of the Commission 
did not mirror the realities of a large number of South Africans that lived under 
apartheid. He has said that the TRC had its own version of truth, reducing it to 
the voices of perpetrators and victims that took part in the process. 215 Critical of 
these definitions and the concept of gross violation of human rights that was 
established, he makes the comparison between the Gulag and the force 
removals of apartheid, after which he adds: ―[The] 3.5 million victims comprise 
faceless communities, not individual activists. They constitute a social 
catastrophe, not merely a political dilemma…Why, then, did the TRC not 
include these people as ‗victims‘?‖216 Essentially, he is saying that the reduction 
of victims to those who suffered politically motivated human rights violations 
such as torture or persecution excluded the large number of victims of 
apartheid laws from the TRC process. Although many Blacks might not have 
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been suffered the violations that the Commission investigated, their lives were 
severely circumscribed by the norms of the racist regime. In the same manner, 
not all whites perpetrated the acts that the Commission oversaw, but they still 
benefited from the racist underpinnings of the regime. These ‗beneficiaries‘, as 
Mamdani calls them, were not brought to account by the Commission because 
their responsibility was not formally recognized in the mandate. In his view, 
these conceptual limitations had a direct negative effect on reconciliation. 
 The omissions of the TRC could have had the effect of limiting racial 
reconciliation and could account for race relations that remain strained in South 
Africa today. According to Fullard, after the TRC, reconciliation is still a largely 
unfulfilled goal. She thinks that the language that the TRC used, such as the 
term ‗political‘ act or the ‗victims and perpetrators‘ binary that the Commission 
dealt with, had the effect of displacing race and racial identity from 
understandings of the violence of the past and the present.217 Valji also 
considers that the process that led to the formation of the TRC could have 
resulted in a rather limited, ‗superficial‘ reconciliation. In disengaging from a 
more open discussion of how racism factored into the violations of human 
rights under the scrutiny of the Commission, the TRC―…has left many of the 
structures of inequality intact and unaddressed and has suppressed dialogue on 
the persistence of racism in the new South Africa.‖218 At a general level, the 
psychologist Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela argues that truth commissions risk 
becoming ―…merely sites of symbolic apology and reconciliation that then 
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stands as a substitute or excuse for actual and substantive transformation.‖219  
In South Africa, the high levels of urban segregation and the 2008 xenophobic 
attacks are possible evidences of the lack of significant change that Gobodo-
Madikizela refers to. In the same manner, Hamber says that there is a ‗silencing‘ 
about how race in the present is still the defining element of social 
relationships.220 Valji attributes this silencing to the suppression of a more open 
dialogue about the racism of apartheid during the TRC.221 At the same time, 
Fullard acknowledges that as much as the work of the TRC could be blamed for 
still problematic race relations in contemporary South Africa, this work was 
inevitably a function of the mandate that established the TRC in the first 
place.222  
If by any measure the TRC failed to deal with race more appropriately, 
the effect of the mandate that established the Commission should be analyzed. 
Fullard note that in the language of the Act there is no reference to ‗apartheid‘, 
‗racism‘ or ‗race‘. Instead, a call to work for a future in which the rights of 
people are upheld irrespective of their color, gender, and so on is made.223 
Hence, Fullard argues that the omission of the issue of race begins with the very 
founding document of the TRC. She says, ―It could be argued that the 
legislation, which is quite literally the constitutive act of the TRC, decenters race 
through the use of descriptors that render the conflicts of the past unspecific 
                                                          
219
 Gobodo-Madikizela, Pumla. “Apologies Aren’t Enough”. Boston Globe. 20 September 2000. 
220
 In Valji, supra note 209 
221
 Valji, 8 
222
 Fullard, 29 
223
 Fullard, 29 
83 
 
and all-encompassing.‖224 She adds that the TRC‘s purpose, which emanated 
from the Act, could have inevitably meant that it had to suppress sites of 
potential conflict such as discussions on race; ―The TRC was […] an instrument 
of national unity and a project of national (re) construction, that involved 
silencing of conflict and concealment of the continuities of injustice from past to 
present, in order to ‗imagine‘ the new nation.‖225 The Commission had to build 
a new narrative that would necessarily preclude the kind of language and 
approach that would put race at the center of the truth telling process; 
―[Racism] had to be excluded from [the TRC‘s] interrogational framework and 
the new values of constitutionalism and citizenship of the new South Africa 
inscribed accordingly.‖226  However, it must be noted that the TRC did move 
beyond the boundaries of its mandate and, in an innovative move, devised a 
series of institutional hearings to examine the issues that critics think were left 
largely unattended.  
Institutional hearings 
Media, business, religious, legal and health sectors among others were all 
brought together under the TRC‘s official attempt to address the structural 
framework of apartheid and disclose the role of these institutions in sustaining 
or defying the system. This was an important development in the truth-telling 
process because the Commission departed from its mandate to have an even 
deeper enquiry into the past. The Commission did not need to establish these 
                                                          
224
 Fullard, 29 
225
 Fullard, 29 
226
 Fullard, 29 
84 
 
hearings since its mandate did not require so. Nevertheless, Commissioners 
recognized that the role of institutions as ‗beneficiaries‘ of apartheid was being 
neglected in the process.227 For this reason, their attempt to fix that aspect was 
commendable. In Fullard‘s view, however, these hearings evidence how the 
TRC process as a whole dangerously disregarded the relevance of racism. She 
refers to these hearings by saying,  
―They [hearings] were the place in the TRC where the questions of race 
and racism were most overtly considered and debated-where race was 
‗admitted‘ into official TRC regard…These hearings stood in awkward 
discontinuity with the amnesty hearings, where, as indicated above, 
racism was excluded as a legitimate political objective.‖228  
It remains true as well that discussing or addressing every aspect of the 
apartheid past was a daunting task, especially when the kind of issues that 
characterized apartheid continued to be felt even within the Commission. The 
involvement of the media, for instance, is a good case in which to examine the 
contradictions and shortcomings of the overall process of transitional justice. A 
‗beneficiary‘ of apartheid itself, media outlets strove to have a positive role 
throughout the life of the TRC. At the same time, they had to come to terms 
with the fact that they were themselves at times the subjects with which the 
Commission was not properly dealing with. For these reasons, an exploration of 
the different views on the role of the media within the process is warranted. 
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The TRC and Media 
The media, meaning newspapers, radio stations and television agencies, 
were key actors of the transitional justice process that South Africa embarked 
upon in 1996. Although the TRC was the cornerstone of this process, it was not 
alone in the pursuit of ‗national unity and reconciliation‘ that the 1995 
Parliamentary Act called for.229 The media delivered the information that came 
out of the TRC hearings with the intent of engaging the rest of society in the 
process. Thereby, the Commission has said that the media helped to enhance 
the public nature of the process, in line with what the Act had envisioned.230 
Furthermore, the TRC Report has commended the fact that the accounts of 
victims and perpetrators effectively reached a large audience even beyond 
South Africa:  
―People saw, for example, a former security police officer demonstrating 
his torture techniques. They saw weeping men and women asking for the 
truth about their missing loved ones. The media also helped generate 
public debate on central aspects of South Africa‘s past and to raise the 
level of historical awareness.‖231  
Even as the process was unfolding, some commentators made the claim that the 
success of the TRC lay with the media.232 Nevertheless, while expectations 
about their involvement in the process ran high, criticism about their work soon 
began to emerge. Particularly, at a 1997 conference titled ―Reporting the Truth 
Commission‖ in which journalists, editors and guests with varied expertise 
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gathered to discuss their role in the TRC, a number of concerns about the way 
media outlets were reporting the hearings were raised.233 Eventually, some of 
these concerns would become the foundation of the main criticisms about the 
media‘s involvement in the TRC.  
From the start of the TRC process, journalists showed committed 
engagement with the task of covering the hearings of the Commission, while 
they also demonstrated concern for a number of dilemmas. The Media 
Monitoring Group (MMG) research study about the media‘s coverage of the 
TRC between two different periods –April 1996 to February 1997 and March to 
September 1997 – confirms that ―…the media covered the TRC 
comprehensively, particularly with regard to specific individual and group 
testimonies, issues of personal and/or political reconciliation, views of different 
political groups on the TRC, and the broad effectiveness of the Commission.‖234 
Antjie Krog, an Afrikaner journalist who followed the work of the Commission 
and wrote about it extensively, depicts the deep level of awareness of 
journalists who were covering it. At a media workshop for those reporting on 
the hearings, she points out at some important questions that journalists were 
dealing with:  
―A workshop is organized for journalists who will be covering the Truth 
Commission and their immediate editors…Various topics are discussed: 
how can exhaustion be prevented? How can viewers, listeners, and 
readers be involved? Should Truth Commission stories be confined to a 
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special page? Won‘t people just skip over this section? How can we see 
to it that the past becomes front-page news? No newspaper has the 
means to cover the commission full-time-will television be able to 
broadcast the hearings daily so that people can follow them from their 
offices?  
What is the role of radio with its access to all the language groups and 
impoverished communities? And do all eleven official languages have 
the words needed to cover the commission? (...).‖235 
These questions are evidence that journalists knew well that covering the 
Commission had complexities that needed to be addressed. Even so, critics 
have pointed out that the media‘s involvement was flawed and weak in 
different ways. 
  In a similar vein to those who argue that the TRC downplayed the 
impact that apartheid had on the lives of far more people than those who were 
directly involved in the hearings, some people also think that media outlets 
mirrored this flaw and missed an opportunity to rectify the shortcomings of the 
truth-telling process. Firstly, people argue that the ‗truth‘ that came out of the 
Commission was taken as such -unchallenged and unquestioned- and delivered 
to the rest of society without a critical filter.236 As a result, in the same way that 
some people have suggested that the TRC narrowed down the conflict to a 
small number of victims and perpetrators, others have said that the media 
failed to portray the complexity of both the apartheid regime and the liberation 
struggle that brought it down.237 In other words, they limited their work to 
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reflecting the process rather than challenging it.238 A point for consideration is 
that the media was in a rather odd position within the process, a consequence of 
what has been described as the media‘s ‗symbiotic‘ relationship with the 
TRC.239A closer look to the debate deems necessary.  
The media utilized the same concepts and ideas that the Commission 
adopted from the Act at the expense of much needed discussion and criticism 
about them. For instance, Anthea Garman thinks that reporters borrowed the 
same ‗victim/perpetrator‘ dichotomy that the TRC used in order to facilitate the 
framing of the information; ―Both the TRC and the media have been guilty of 
seeking out those who fit into these two neat categories so that the story is easy 
to relate and fits a neat guilty-innocent dichotomy.‖240 Furthermore, Brandon 
Hamber echoes the argument of a number of people who have said that the 
media did not disclose anything new other than what the TRC managed to 
gather at the hearings.241 He comments, ―…The media reflecting the truths 
revealed by the TRC should not be undermined, but it is unlikely that truth 
alone will be sufficient to change the ingrained apartheid mindset.‖242 The fact 
that racism was minimally mentioned as an explanatory variable of the events 
                                                          
238
 Hamber, Brandon. “Reflecting on the Truth: Has the media coverage of the TRC changed the way the 
public sees itself, its history and its responsibility?”Paper presented at the TRC and Human Rights 
Journalism in South African Workshop. 3 October 1997. Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation. Web. Accessed on January, 2011 at http://www.csvr.org.za/articles/artrcros.htm 
(hereafter Hamber) 
239
 Krabill, Ron. “Symbiosis: mass media and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa.” 
Media Culture Society, 2001. 23:567. Pg. 583 (hereafter Krabill) 
240
 Garman, “How the TRC and the media have impacted each other”, supra note 237 
241
 Hamber, supra note 238 
242
 Hamber, supra note 238  
89 
 
that the media reported on is unsettling to critics of their work.243 For instance, 
in the same MMG research study that corroborates that the media covered the 
Commission, the lacked of contextual analysis of this coverage is noted, 
particularly the aspect of racial segregation: 
―[…] Stories were largely covered without any direct reference to race 
and racism. While the coverage often related to individual incidents or 
sets of incidents, these were very seldom described in racial terms. 
Instead, the media preferred to label incidents as ―human rights abuses‖ 
or ―politically motivated crimes‖, thereby downplaying the racial 
element…‖244  
The study makes the observation that the omission of racism from these reports 
has the problematic implication of undermining the relevance of race to 
understand the past in South Africa and the cases that the Commission dealt 
with: 
―While there is no doubt that the victims of repression under apartheid 
were indeed the victims of gross human rights abuses, it is also clear that 
many such incidents were informed by societal and institutional racism. 
While these acts may have been committed under the influence of a 
certain political ideology and could thus be regarded as political, the 
media has been complicit in denying the essential racist rationale 
involved. Much of the coverage simply ignored the racially-motivated 
context altogether.‖245 
Overall, the main point of concern here is the apparent disregard of context, 
and in this case the way reporting was done is relevant.  
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Through their reporting, some people think that the media furthered the 
omission of the wider picture of apartheid. In limiting their work to passing on 
the information of the human rights violations and the amnesty hearings to the 
public without a proper framework, they did not reflect the larger complexities 
of apartheid.246 Bird and Garda find it problematic that stories mostly focused 
on certain aspects of people‘s accounts, leaving out other important aspects that 
could have provided some background to understand these accounts; ―Most 
media reporters would quote extensively from a survivor‘s testimony, 
especially of their suffering, but fail to report on the survivor‘s life afterwards 
or on their demands or requests from the commission.‖ 247 For this reason, the 
large numbers of people who were affected and benefited by apartheid fell 
outside of the frame of reportage of media outlets. At a conference in Cape 
Town titled ―Reporting the Truth Commission‖, journalist Tony Weaver 
highlighted that the real object of reconciliation was among victims and the 
beneficiaries of the apartheid system, an assertion that echoes Mahmood 
Mamdani‘s main argument.248 But instead, media limited their coverage to high 
profile cases.249 In fact, some have suggested that the media did not represent 
properly those who were against the truth-telling process because they abided 
by this process without hesitance.250 This argument puts the spotlight on a key 
aspect of the media‘s involvement in the TRC, which has to do with the 
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ambivalent relationship and position of certain media outlets during apartheid 
and in transitional justice process. 
The involvement of the media in the TRC process, although perceived as 
fundamentally necessary for the success of this process, was also problematic 
and ambivalent. On the one hand, the media were seeing as allies of the 
transitional justice process. TRC deputy chairperson Alex Boraine has said,  
―The TRC owes a huge debt to the media of South Africa. Without 
coverage in newspapers and magazines and without the account of 
proceedings on TV screens and without the voice of the TRC being 
beamed through radio across the land, its work would be disadvantaged 
and immeasurably poorer.‖251  
On the other hand, media workers also had to come to terms with their own 
roles and their mixed records of victimhood and culpability throughout 
apartheid. Hence, it was particularly difficult for journalists to report on a 
process of which they themselves were part of at different levels: 
―Journalists have found themselves being pulled into the events being 
covered. Some were victims of human rights abuses themselves, some 
were perpetrators; some found themselves implicated as part of the 
group who benefited from apartheid. Some just found the ‗endless 
repetition of horror‘…psychologically overwhelming.”252 
Antjie Krog says that learning about the atrocities that members of her 
Afrikaner ancestry committed was a traumatic event.253Also, in her depictions 
of the issues that media members had to grapple with when reporting the 
Commission, she portrays the ambivalent position in which many journalists 
found themselves in. At one particular instance at a TRC workshop for the 
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media, Krog highlights the comments of two journalists –one from the Sowetan, 
whose readership was and still is mainly Black, and Beeld, a distinctively 
Afrikaaner newspaper- which offer a clear picture of the difficult stance of the 
media within the TRC:  
―By late afternoon we are discussing how you keep your own past out 
your reporting. The journalist from the Sowetan stands up: ―My 
newspaper‘s position is that it has actually always done TRC-type stories 
and will not make any special effort to cover the commission.‖ 
Willem Pretorious of Beeld is on his feet. ―In the army, I was sent to cut 
off Radio Freedom‘s cables and take them off the air. What does that 
make me? Can I-or can I not-report on the Truth Commission?‖254 
Nevertheless, to some people the complex relationship between the media and 
the TRC did not rule out the possibility of being more autonomous in the 
process. Critics have argued that journalists could have still played a better or 
more effective role by ―disentangling themselves from their ‗symbiotic‘ 
relationship with the Commission‖.255 In failing to do so, some people believe 
that the media did not take on the many issues surrounding the TRC. Yet, the 
extent to which the ambivalent position of the media had any impact in the 
work they carried out throughout the transitional justice process should still be 
noted. Nowhere was the relevance of this position as obvious as it was during 
the TRC institutional hearings. 
The Media in the TRC institutional hearings  
The media hearings, as part of the number of other hearings in which the 
TRC examined the role of institutions during apartheid, disclosed the many 
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ways in which media outlets could have been responsible for the human rights 
violations that took place in the past. These hearings are important not only 
because they show evidence of the complexity of media‘s involvement in the 
TRC process. The hearings challenge criticism directed at the Commission and 
the media that blames them for excluding large numbers of people from the 
process and undermining the relevance of race and racism during apartheid. 
The real value of these hearings is that clear evidence of how the media 
establishment fulfilled a role in supporting the apartheid system - often in 
subtle ways but still relevant ones - and perpetuating racism is brought to 
forefront. 
Previous knowledge of the fact that the media had a an incriminatory 
role in supporting the apartheid system is evident from the decision of holding 
the hearings at the offices of the South African Broadcasting Agency (SABC), 
later described in the TRC Report as ―…a blatantly pro-government and 
apartheid institution.‖256 At the hearings, the Commission found that for the 
most part, the media ―sanctioned‖ apartheid in various ways. Yet, some media 
outlets bore far more responsibility than others. For instance, the Commission 
found that by misrepresenting the human rights violations of the government, 
the Afrikaans press was particularly liable for instigating apartheid‘s prejudice.  
 ―The Afrikaans press as a whole stands condemned for promoting the 
superiority of whites and displaying an indifference to the sufferings of 
people of colour. Despite a limited number of individuals who rejected 
the system, and despite examples of resistance to the policy of slavish 
reporting on government and race related issues, exceptions to the long 
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history of actively promoting the former state and its policies were minor 
ones.‖257 
In fact, the Commission declared that the Afrikaans media was at times directly 
responsible for providing support to the government‘s security forces.258 On the 
part of the English media, the Commission accused them for establishing a 
policy of appeasement towards the state, which encouraged a large measure of 
self-censorship that would not allow condemnation of government‘s 
violations.259 Most prominently, the Commission determined that the SABC 
was ―a tool of government.‖260 The interviews that senior broadcasts Hendrik 
and Christel Bussiek carried out with SABC workers helped to confirm that the 
broadcasting agency was closely related to the apartheid state. Furthermore, 
research done by Professor John van Zyl found that the SABC‘s coverage 
‗normalized‘ apartheid‘s daily occurrences:  
―Content analysis by Professor John van Zyl over a period of sixteen 
years revealed a distinct bias at the SABC. According to his analysis, 
news bulletins maintained and cultivated a mindset amongst white 
viewers that apartheid was natural and inevitable. SABC programming, 
he found, was instrumental in cultivating a ―war psychosis‖, which in 
turn created an environment in which human rights abuses could take 
place.‖261  
At the same time, the Commission recognized that as much as media 
propaganda contributed to the status quo, the liberation forces also had a stake 
in the perpetuation and intensification of violent conflict. For this reason, 
accusations from the South African Defense Force (SADF) about the role of 
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Radio Freedom –the ANC‘s main media outlet- in instigating violence were 
taken up by the TRC. Nevertheless, the Commission made a sharp distinction 
about the way Radio Freedom could have enhanced the climate of violence. 
Commissioners reached to the conclusion that it is implausible to prove how 
radio broadcasts alone were responsible ―…for the large number of incidents of 
gross human rights violations recorded in the SADF document, particularly as 
nobody was forced to tune in and listen to Radio Freedom.‖262 In a similar 
manner, even though racism was inserted into the legal system, the 
Commission found that some media establishments actively pursued racist 
actions beyond the parameters of law.  
 Although many laws were put in place to implement the racist 
foundations of the apartheid regime and also to restrict the agency of the media 
to challenge the system, the Commission found evidence of high levels of 
racism within media institutions that make them accountable. The state was 
active in its pursuit of curtailing media‘s freedom via laws that inevitably 
enhanced racial injustices. At the same time, Commissioners declared: ―It 
would seem, however, that discrimination went way beyond what was 
required by apartheid legislation. Individual testimony to the Commission 
confirmed this, validating the allegations made by Black journalists.‖263 In fact, 
Black journalists manifested that racism took on different forms but was ever-
present. For instance, they described that a selective approach to news stories 
was commonplace. This was done by questioning the legitimacy of a Black 
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journalist‘s story or by giving a higher priority to stories that involved whites, 
even though those that involved Blacks were more relevant.264 In addition, they 
claimed that they had fewer opportunities for training or promotion, and they 
were penalized if they missed work days to go to a march while whites would 
not.265 These issues show proof that the concerns which journalists expressed at 
the start of the TRC process were well-founded. The media would in fact be 
challenged in their coverage work particularly by virtue of their position during 
apartheid.  
 This chapter has shown that the work of the TRC and the media had 
limitations that, in the view of some critics, carried negative implications. 
Specifically, the terminology of the Commission excluded a large portion of the 
population that either suffered or benefited from the regime. The lack of 
recognition of the thousands of victims of apartheid laws and the many 
individuals and institutions which, even though did not perpetrate the number 
of ‗violations of human rights‘ that figured in the Commission‘s mandate but 
still advantaged from it, may have undermined the possibility of establishing 
an all-encompassing process of reconciliation. Furthermore, the minimal 
reference about how racism was the motivating element of the human rights 
violations under scrutiny by the TRC and the media may have prevented much 
needed challenge and discussion about the racist attitudes that characterized 
the past. The ways in which these problematic limitations impact contemporary 
race relations in South Africa will be the subject of the next chapter.  
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ifteen years after the end of apartheid, assessing official efforts 
aimed at overcoming the divisive legacy of the racist regime in 
South Africa seems appropriate. An analysis of the impact of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the media‘s role in disseminating this 
impact during the transition to democracy is now becoming possible because 
the passing of time allows for retrospective analysis. The effect of these two key 
actors of the transitional justice process can now be measured against the 
background of contemporary issues. In this regard, it is important to keep in 
mind that the end of apartheid did not usher in the beginning of a non-racial 
society in South Africa. To a much lesser degree, arguably, race and racism 
continue to be part of the social fabric of South African society in many ways.  
Often, newspaper headlines bring attention to particular instances that 
reveal the still present racial tensions in the country. For instance, in November 
of 2010, the comments of Anneli Botes, a well-known Afrikaner novelist, 
sparked controversy over the level of racism in society. Her public assertion of 
her dislike of Black people stirred a round of debate about unspoken racist 
sentiments that people still harbored.266 In an interview with Rapport 
newspaper, she was asked who the people the she dislikes the most are. Her 
reply was blunt: ―Black people.‖ She continued by saying, ―In my daily life, 
there's no one else that I feel threatened by except black people. If a courier 
comes to my door and he's white, coloured or Indian, I'd have no problem 
inviting him in for a glass of water. But I would feel threatened by a black 
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man.‖267 Interestingly, as much as many condemned and labeled the writer‘s 
sentiments as racist, there were also people who praised her for speaking 
openly about what others would not dare to express.268 It is these types of 
seemingly ordinary incidents that bring South Africa back to revealing 
discussions about apartheid‘s legacy. People have argued, for instance, that the 
2008 xenophobic attacks, in which foreigners and South Africans alike were 
victims of violent attacks in urban townships, are a continuation of the recent 
history of racial violence, or that the generally high level of crime has its origin 
in the inequality that the apartheid regime created through racial segregation.269 
For these reasons, attempts to measure the state of race relations in South Africa 
in a more rigorous, scientific manner have emerged, rendering disparate 
results. For instance, in 2000 and 2001, the scholar James Gibson conducted 
research on the impact of the TRC on racial reconciliation in the country, and he 
concluded that a high degree of interracial reconciliation appears to have been 
achieved.270 However, the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) -by 
the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) which has conducted an annual 
survey since 2003- has shown that levels of interaction among people of 
different races have remained consistently low.271 Although the disparity of the 
findings could be attributed to different periods of time in which the research 
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studies were administered, a closer look to the analyses of the data can provide 
important insights.  
James Gibson’s Approach 
 If reconciliation is understood as the improvement of racial relations, 
says James Gibson, South Africa has made significant progress. In his view, 
reconciliation in South Africa goes beyond the relationship between victims and 
perpetrators of the human rights violations of apartheid, and it encompasses 
those who were ―masters and slaves‖ within the racial system.272 Essentially, he 
says that reconciliation means historically divided racial groups ―getting along 
better; a diminution of racial animosities.‖273 Therefore, the goal of 
reconciliation is that South Africans of different races learn to treat each other as 
equals who are worthy of respect.―Consequently,‖ he says, ―a ‗reconciled‘ 
South African is one who: eschews racial stereotyping [and] treats people 
respectfully, as individuals, and not as members of a racial group (…).‖274 This 
type of scenario would be the by-product of more interracial communication, 
greater empathy and embracement of multiculturalism and diversity. 275 Hence, 
Gibson designed his work along these parameters.  
 The results of Gibson‘s survey indicate that reconciliation in South Africa 
has been consolidated, an outcome in his view of the TRC. His survey, which 
was administered in 2000 and 2001, concludes that about 44% of the population 
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is ―at least somewhat reconciled.‖276 He suggests that given that no similar 
research work had been done before this survey, it is fair to assume that 
reconciliation in previous years and certainly throughout apartheid was 
remarkably lower than 44%. This leads him to make the following assertion: 
―That nearly one-half of the South African population expresses some degree of 
reconciliation in less than a decade after the formal demise of apartheid 
represents, from my perspective, an unexpectedly high level of reconciliation. 
Reconciliation seems to have made inroads into a sizable portion of the South 
African population.‖277 He specifically attributes what he sees as an 
improvement in racial relations to the work of the TRC. Moreover, he says, no 
evidence indicates that the truth of the Commission harmed the goal of 
reconciliation.278 On the contrary, he argues, the findings demonstrate ―that 
truth and reconciliation do indeed go together and are compatible with the 
view that the collective memory produced by the truth and reconciliation 
process contributes to levels of reconciliation.‖279 Certainly though, this 
conclusion ignores other findings in the analysis which are worth noting, such 
as that only 33% of Africans agreed that they were ―somewhat reconciled‖ 
against the larger 56% and 59% of whites and Coloured people respectively.280 
Gibson also recognizes some limitations when trying to establish causality. 
However, he concludes that the more people accept the process of the TRC, the 
more likely that they will feel reconciled with people from other racial groups.  
                                                          
276
 Gibson, “Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?”, supra note 270, 93 
277
 Gibson, “Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?”, supra note 270, 93 
278
 Gibson, “Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?”, supra note 270,  84 
279
 Gibson, “Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?”, supra note 270, 96 
280
 Gibson, “Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?”, supra note 270, 92 
102 
 
 Gibson argues that the TRC‘s success lay in the fact that it did not make 
distinctions between individuals who committed gross violations of human 
rights during apartheid. In contrast to this thesis‘ main hypothesis, –that the 
TRC‘s overall even-handedness contributed to race relations that remain 
problematic in South Africa- he proposes that Commission‘s equal treatment of 
guilt and responsibility could be the reason why his survey shows positive 
results. Had the TRC allocated all the blame on one side, he says, it would have 
been much less unlikely to achieve meaningful reconciliation.281 Although 
many people disagree with the Commission‘s ‗even-handedness‘, Gibson 
regards it as the ideal approach to violations of human rights. In the TRC 
report, Commissioners explain that this approach was informed by standards of 
international law which strictly prohibit acts such as torture or the killing of 
civilians. In light of this view, even those who might have justly fought against 
the apartheid regime could have been responsible for carrying out acts that 
could not, under any circumstances, be regarded as ―morally or legally 
legitimate.‖282 Hence, the Commission acknowledged that human rights 
violations were committed by either state or non-state actors.283 Gibson 
considers that this acknowledgment, ―that both sides in the struggle [whites 
and Blacks] did horrible things‖, is perhaps the TRC‘s most important lesson.284  
Thanks to this approach, he argues, whites could realize how the system that 
benefited them was ―less than noble‖ and that those who actively opposed it 
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were ―less radically evil.‖285 Similarly, Blacks were also given a chance to 
change their attitudes towards whites after learning that their liberation 
movement was not devoid of some degree of responsibility for the human 
rights violations that were committed during apartheid.286  
In his assessment of the work of the media, Gibson suggests that it was 
precisely the simplicity with which they delivered the truth that came out of the 
hearings of the Commission that engaged people in the process. 287 In contrast 
to critics of the work of the media during the TRC, like Edward Bird, Zureida 
Garda and Anthea Garman which are mentioned in Chapter 3, Gibson 
considers that the way the media framed the stories of the TRC was successful, 
because in lacking an ―explicit ideological veneer, […] they were palatable to 
South Africans of many different ideological persuasions.‖288 The information, 
which he qualifies as ―simple and subtle‖, attracted the attention of people to 
the process because it was largely focused on the human side. The TRC, 
through the media, put forward stories that had to do with ―bad guys hurting 
good guys.‖289  
However, one could argue that this framework was dangerously 
simplistic because it dismissed the role of the racist foundation that sustained 
the apartheid regime. Specifically, critics of the media and the TRC, as well as 
this thesis, regard that both establishments failed to promote racial 
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reconciliation because no effective discussion on racism took place during the 
transitional justice process. The TRC‘s even-handedness that Gibson praises, 
and the simplicity of the information that reached wider society which he 
values, might just as well effectively disengaged the ‗beneficiaries‘ that 
Mahmood Mamdani refers to from reflecting on their own roles during 
apartheid. Similarly, the majority of Blacks who did not qualify as victims 
under TRC terms, could have felt that the conflict‘s portrayal was unjustly 
partial because it did not take into account their hardships. In fact, many did 
feel so. Hence, to what extent do these views defy Gibson‘s interpretation of his 
data? The South African Reconciliation Barometer poses an alternative reading 
of the state of reconciliation in the country. Particularly, the Barometer‘s 
analysis of race relations poses a direct challenge to Gibson‘s findings.  
The State of Reconciliation: The South African Reconciliation Barometer 
 Since 2003, the SARB has treated race relations as an important indicator 
when measuring the degree of reconciliation that the country has achieved. 
Established by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), the Barometer 
measures the public‘s opinion on different issues, and the results are compiled 
and published in a report.290 The complexity that is intrinsic to the concept of 
reconciliation is acknowledged, but the IJR asserts that developing certain 
quantifiable indicators that give a better picture of the degree of reconciliation is 
plausible.291 The foundation of the SARB survey is modeled around the ―contact 
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hypothesis‖ or inter-group contact theory, which suggests that higher levels of 
interaction among people of different racial groups lead to a reduction in 
prejudicist attitudes and conflict among these groups.292 Hence, echoing 
Gibson‘s argument, the main hypothesis of SARB is that if ―…South Africans of 
different races hold fewer negative perceptions of each other, reconciliation is 
more likely to occur.‖293 The factors of identity, tolerance, and socialization 
among different racial groups are considered.294 In the context of this thesis, the 
relevance of this survey lies in its stated goal, which is to assess how people‘s 
opinions may have an impact ―…on national unity and reconciliation in post-
apartheid South Africa.‖295 This language mirrors the objective of the 
Parliamentary Act that established the TRC. As a result, the Barometer stands 
not only as a tool that shows where South Africa is in terms of reconciliation. 
Although it is not an explicit evaluation of the TRC, the Barometer could as well 
be taken as a measure of the efficacy of the Commission in fostering 
reconciliation in general.  
  The most relevant findings of the 2010 SARB are that while almost half of 
the population perceives that race relations in South Africa have improved 
since the end of apartheid, interracial interaction and socialization remain low. 
The latter appears to have remained consistent over the years.296 At a basic 
level, most respondents said that they identify with people who primarily 
speak their same language, followed by those who belong to their same ethnic 
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group and race group. According to the report, this tendency has remained near 
constant since 2007.297 At a general level, the report notes that ―...close to half of 
all South Africans (47%) feel that there has been an improvement in race 
relations in the country since 1994. A further 30% feel race relations have stayed 
the same over this sixteen year period, and 21% that they have worsened.‖298 
However, 42% of South Africans ―rarely‖ or ―never‖ speak to people of other 
race groups, and a high 60% ―rarely‖ or ―never‖ socialize with people of other 
race categories.299 Furthermore, 62% of South Africans found ―the customs and 
ways of others difficult to understand…‖300, and 35% of people consider groups 
from outside their race group to be untrustworthy.301 The latter findings are 
relevant because the Barometer‘s hypothesis –if South Africans of different 
races hold fewer negative perceptions of each other, reconciliation is more 
likely to occur- is somewhat disproved in light of the particularly high 
percentage of people who find people from other races unreliable or their 
customs rather odd. 
 When the analyses of James Gibson and the Reconciliation Barometer are 
compared, the complexity of assessing race relations becomes clearer. These 
studies are important because they show how certain research methods could 
measure the impact of a truth-telling process on a specific aspect of society-in 
this case, race relations.  They engage with the difficult task of providing 
empirical evidence that help to draw connections with the TRC process, 
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specifically James Gibson‘s work. At the same time, that these studies make 
different assertions on the state of race relations deserves further discussion. For 
this reason, more research work is needed in order to have more sources for 
comparison and correlation. This thesis grapples with this need and attempts to 
add another possible way of understanding race relations in South Africa today 
as related to the transitional justice process.  
This thesis will make use of inductive analysis in order to establish the 
ways in which TRC‘s work and race relations in the present may be connected. 
In parallel, content analysis will reveal how the media frames racial issues 
today and the reasons for choosing such frameworks. Two particular events 
will be explored: the Reitz Four case and the murder of Eugene Terre‘Blanche. 
These are good cases in line with the purpose of this thesis for following main 
reasons: a strong presence of the component of race; clear links to the history of 
apartheid and its legacy; the nature of the debates that ensued; and their 
extensive coverage in the media. Other cases could have been integrated in this 
discussion as well. Nevertheless, the Reitz Four incident and the murder of 
Terre‘Blanche have happened at a recent time period that enables the necessary 
perspective for retrospective analysis. These cases bring to the fore how race is 
still a highly complex issue in South Africa which deserves further analysis.   
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Reitz Four: A University and Race 
“When the focus of analysis shifts from that of individual pathology to one of institutional 
culture, then it becomes clear that the problem of Reitz is not simply a problem of four racially 
troubled students. It is, without a question, a problem of institutional complicity.” 302 
 
 Only a few events truly capture people‘s attention and stir the kind of 
debate that brings to light how race continues to be relevant in South Africa. 
The ‗Reitz Four‘ saga, as it came to be known in the media, was one of those 
cases.  It involved a video which showed five Black cleaners of a men‘s 
residence at the University of the Free State (UFS) being humiliated by four 
white Afrikaner students in what appeared to be an ‗initiation ritual‘.303 The 
video, recorded in September 2007 by the same students who administered the 
initiation ritual, and leaked in February 2008, caused a wave of outrage and 
condemnations from all levels of society. In the same manner, the decision of a 
new UFS Vice-chancellor to pardon the students for their actions was highly 
unwelcomed, initiating a new round of national debate regarding proper 
measures of justice to cases in which racism is a key issue. In July 2010, two 
years after the video became public, the Bloemfontein Magistrate‘s Court found 
the four students guilty of crimen injuria, which under South African law, is 
any act that intentionally and seriously impairs the dignity of others.304  
The case became especially notorious as it spurred nationwide debate. 
The Reitz Four incident was as much about the five Black workers and the four 
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white students in the video as it was about the environment of UFS as an 
academic institution. This event brought to light a number of troubling aspects 
that questioned the extent to which features of apartheid were truly in the past 
for this university. For instance, other issues of racism at UFS came to light, 
such as the continuing role of a political party in exacerbating those issues and 
memories of the position of the university during apartheid, as well as the 
legacy of that position. At the same time, the decision of the university‘s new 
vice-Chancellor to withdraw charges against the students was remarkable as it 
was done in the same spirit of reconciliation that the TRC aimed to embrace, 
and in spite the immediate reaction of most newspapers to this decision which 
was overwhelmingly critical.  
All these elements reveal a number of important dimensions for the 
analysis of race relations in South Africa today. The first dimension relates to 
the persistence of a racist legacy that has yet to be effectively uprooted. Another 
dimension relates to the way most people reacted and condemned the acts of 
the students, suggesting that racist acts are deeply rejected. At the same time, a 
larger debate about the state of race relations in the country curiously did not 
ensue. At best, the Reitz Four debate triggered a discussion and a revision of 
racial problems on university campuses. In this context, newspapers focused 
overwhelmingly on the individuals involved in the video, and they did so from 
a condemnatory angle. However, the conciliatory approach of the Vice-
chancellor is particularly important in this analysis because it suggests the 
possibility that the TRC set a strong precedent. Related to this is the reaction of 
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the newspapers to the Vice-chancellor‘s decision, which seems to have revived 
the same debate about justice that accompanied the creation of the TRC. On one 
level, the generally negative response of a number of newspapers mirrors 
sentiments of unfulfilled injustice among Blacks, similar to the way that the 
TRC process and the foregoing of prosecutions dissatisfied some victims in the 
past. On another level, the supportive tone of newspapers such as the 
Mail&Guardian and Business Day reflects the type of attitude that individuals 
like Desmond Tutu, Nelson Mandela and others stood for at the demise of 
apartheid.  
 Reitz Four: Overview of the Case 
 In a timeframe of ten minutes, four white young men appear on a video 
subjecting five Black workers to what appear to be initiation rituals, which 
range from a running competition, to emptying beer bottles, to ultimately 
bending on the floor to eat what looks like food in which one of the students 
had urinated. The video, which was filmed in September 2007, became a 
scandal at a national level when the Afrikaner newspaper Beeld published it in 
February 2008.305 The white men in the video -Danie Grobler, Johnny Roberts, 
Roelf Malherde and Schalk van der Merwe – were Afrikaner students of the 
University of the Free State (UFS), which is located in Bloemfontein (capital of 
the Free State province of South Africa‘s central region). The scene took place in 
the residence halls of the all male‘s student hostel ―President Reitz‖ - hence the 
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name that the case earned in the media.306 Mothibedi Molete, Mankoe Phororo, 
Emmah Koko, Nkgapeng Adams and Sebuasengwe Ntlatseng, all janitors of the 
hostel, were the targets of the ―initiation rituals‖ that the students 
administered.307 Soon after the video‘s release, the South African Human Rights 
Commission initiated an investigation into allegations that the university had 
condoned human rights violations.308 Parallel to this, university officials stated 
that its legal-department would seek to file criminal charges against the 
students. Ultimately, it was decided that the criminal charges would be left in 
the hands of the South African authorities while the university would appoint a 
disciplinary committee to deal with the case.309 Four months after the scandal, 
the university‘s rector Teuns Verschoor announced to the council of the 
university his decision to close down the Reitz residence.310 Eventually, Roelf 
Malherde and Schalk van der Merwe were dismissed from the university and 
banned from campus, while Danie Grobler and Johnny Roberts had already 
finished their studies. 311 The students claimed to the court that the workers had 
freely participated in the video, but still admitted their guilt and asked for 
forgiveness. In the end, the Bloemfontein Magistrate‘s Court found the four 
students guilty of crimen injuria in July 2010.312 An aspect that quickly became 
prominent in the discussion surrounding this case was the position of the 
university during apartheid, and how that might help explain the ongoing 
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issues of racism that were brought to the spotlight. The wrongdoing of four 
individuals served to reveal the institutional dimension of racism, thereby 
suggesting a failure to fully remove some remnants of the racist past.  
UFS and the Burden of History  
 Pressing issues of racism at UFS, often regarded as a ‗bastion for 
Afrikaners‘,  came under the national spotlight with the Reitz Four case. Former 
vice-rector of the university Teuns Verschoor admitted that an uncritical 
approach to politics had characterized UFS throughout history. When the 
British were in power in the early years of the 20th century, he said, ―the 
university operated in English only and excluded many people on the basis of 
their race as well as their language.― Once Afrikaans became the official 
language in the late 1940‘s, ―[the university] not only followed but actively 
promoted the apartheid policy.‖313 For this reason, university authorities have 
been trying to dismantle the legacy of the apartheid past by diversifying the 
student body, which today is made up of 58% African, 35% white, 5% coloured, 
and 2% Indian.314 Yet, according to Black students who were interviewed by a 
white press reporter on the university campus, the percentages do not reflect 
how race still determines social interactions.  ―Just look around‖, said one of the 
interviewees when referring to different groups of students, ―They are all 
racially separate groups. They think we‘re funny to be speaking to you.‖315 
Other Black students noted the high levels of exclusion in the residences, which 
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some even feared passing by due to the possibility of being verbally or 
physically abused.316 Efforts to change this situation have not been met without 
obstacles either.  
  Throughout most of the 1990s, integration policies caused much conflict 
at UFS. For instance, in 1992, a policy was put in place to de-segregate 
residences. Nevertheless, violent protests led to their ‗re-segregation‘. 317 The 
Reitz student residence was closed after some students released teargas in a 
university hall. Some years later, however, it reopened due to reported ‗white-
flight‘ from other university dorms because more Black students were moving 
in. Thereafter, the Reitz residence gained the negative reputation of being 
‗rowdy‘ and, as one student called it, ―a home for disgruntled right-wing 
students during the mid-Nineties.‖318 In 2007, the university tried to implement 
a policy that would re-integrate the residences, mandating that they each had to 
include at least 30% Black students. The attempt was unpopular in sections of 
the Afrikaner community of the university, with protests and demonstrations 
on campus following the implementation of the policy.319 In the aftermath of 
the Reitz Four incident, these racial issues were brought up by the media. 
Interestingly, a link was established between the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) and 
its role in exacerbating Afrikaner students‘ defiance of university efforts to 
bridge racial divides.  
                                                          
316
 Monako Dibetle, supra note 311 
317
 Monako Dibetle, supra note 305 
318
 Dibetle, Monako and Cornia Pretorius. ‘Reitz had been home to troublemakers’, “Racist video: FF+ 
must take rap’”, Mail&Guardian, February 29 to March 6 2008. 
319
 Monako Dibetle, supra note 305 
114 
 
 The FF+ is a small political party in South Africa that explicitly aims to 
safeguard the interests of Afrikaners. Founded in 1994 by the right-wing leader 
Constant Viljoen, the party has stood on a platform that is largely defined by an 
ethnic/racial component and secessionist ambitions. The party‘s ideology, 
which is modeled on the concept of minority rights, puts forward the argument 
that in a heterogeneous society such as South Africa, a ―one man, one vote‖ 
system leaves the Afrikaner minority at an unfairly disadvantaged position.320 
Under the leadership of Pieter Mulder, who is now Deputy Minister of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the party has continuously pressed for a 
legitimate Afrikaner dispensation and the provision of territorial autonomy (an 
Afrikaner ‗volkstat‘ or homeland) in the region of the North Western Cape, in 
an area between the Orange River and the West Coast.321 Although the party 
retains four seats in the National Assembly as of now, its political influence is 
low. Nevertheless, in provinces like the Free State where Afrikaners make up a 
significant portion of the white population, the FF+ can still rally enthusiastic 
supporters who feel threatened with official efforts at empowering the 
previously disenfranchised Black majority. Places like UFS, where racial 
tensions have run high for most of its history, are breeding grounds of potential 
followers for FF+, despite the fact that when compared with the large reach of 
major parties, the party mobilizes only a small number of people nationally.  
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Although there was no specific connection between the FF+ and the 
Reitz Four incident, the party had a role in upsetting strategies towards racial 
integration at UFS which may have contributed to the types of attitudes that 
were present in the Reitz Four video. According to one press story, the political 
party and its youth wing, which stand on a platform of protection and 
representation of Afrikaner interests, have long been instrumental in 
historically-white academic institutions for promoting campaigns against racial 
integration.322 During the 1990s, the party was involved at UFS through a 
cultural organization that promoted Afrikaner values. For instance, at the time 
when the Reitz Four case became a national controversy, the Student 
Representative Council (SRC) of UFS consisted of 16 members, of which 13 
were members of the FF+. The role of the party became particularly relevant at 
the outset of the university‘s official efforts towards integration. In July 2007, 
the time when the university council approved the residence integration policy, 
the FF+ national leader Pieter Mulder, as well as other members of the party, 
was present at one of the biggest marches on campus organized by the party 
against the new policy.323 According to Sandra Botha, the then parliamentary 
leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA) party, racist songs such as Bobbejaan klim 
die Berg, (―baboon climbs the mountain‖) were allegedly sung by FF+ 
supporters at the march.324 Furthermore, in November of the same year, the 
party challenged the university‘s integration policy in court but withdrew the 
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case. 325 However, the persistent demand of the party for racial separation did 
not dwindle even at the height of the controversy that the video sparked.  
Although the FF+ denied any connection to the UFS student body and 
rejected accusations of responsibility for the Reitz Four scandal, in arguing for 
racial separation, party members were tacitly condoning the behavior of 
students. In one instance, the FF+ youth congress in the Northern Cape 
Province resolved that government-imposed quotas on student organizations, 
courses and residences would be countered by promoting a ‗culture of freedom 
of association‘. At the time, the national youth leader Cornelius Jansen van 
Rensburg expressed: ―How free am I if government policy determines whom I 
should share a room with?‖326 In trying to justify the racist sentiments that 
materialized at UFS, Pieter Mulder- the FF+ national leader- pointed at the 
famous ―Two Nation‖ speech of former President Thabo Mbeki.327 He 
suggested that by alluding to the existence of two distinct racial groups (these 
groups being Blacks and whites), the former president had set a tone that 
would inevitably exacerbate racial tensions. In addition, he mentioned the 
unintended consequences of the policy of black economic empowerment and 
how it could feed into Afrikaner students‘ frustrations:  
―Everyone has respect for [Nelson] Mandela and his rainbow nation, but 
it was exactly 10 years ago that [Thabo] Mbeki made his two-nation 
speech. He scratched out the rainbow nation with that speech by 
continuously speaking about two races… [ ] 
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Perhaps we are reaping the fruits of this. Students know that racism is 
unacceptable, but in the back of their heads they know once they leave 
university they will face affirmative action. They know they will be 
discriminated against and we don‘t know what role this is playing in the 
aggressive behavior we are now seeing.‖328 
Certainly, Mulder‘s comments reflected the types of ideas and perceptions that 
continue to justify racism, particularly at academic institutions that carry the 
burden of apartheid‘s history like UFS and University of Pretoria. Although 
UFS authorities made gestures to change aspects of the university that were a 
legacy of apartheid‘s racism, a portion of the Afrikaner student body, 
sponsored by some political actors with a particular agenda, have actively 
pursued ways to undermine any meaningful change.  
Thanks to the Reitz Four incident, issues of racism at the institutional 
level were revealed and a debate on the state of higher education ensued. The 
enduring racial segregation in the dorms, the strained relations among students 
of different racial groups, the dissatisfaction of members of the Afrikaner 
student body towards integration efforts, and the effect of political ideology in 
fostering racism at UFS were some of the problems that surfaced with this 
incident. These issues were unsettling because they made it seem as if nothing 
had truly changed at UFS. If anything, the departure from the past had only 
been superficial, while at a deeper level, the racist culture that characterized the 
institution during apartheid was still deeply rooted in its essence. At a broader 
level, while the incident sparked a debate on the status of higher education, it 
did not go beyond this realm of discussion. For instance, the Education Minister 
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set up investigative committees to look into any irregularities on campuses that 
could dampen integration efforts. Furthermore, the vice-chancellor of the 
University of Limpopo, Mahlo Mokgalong, urged his colleagues to be frank and 
face the fact that there was a problem in the higher education system. He and 
all of the country‘s public university vice-chancellors convened to discuss 
strategies to combat racism at a meeting in March of 2008.  Apart from these 
gestures, a general consensus seems to exist about the wrongness of the acts 
committed in the video.  
The press covered the Reitz Four incident from a condemnatory angle, 
fair evidence that racist acts are not tolerated and earn the condemnation of the 
majority of the population. The fact that Beeld, the same Afrikaner newspaper 
that had declined to appear before the TRC, brought attention to the video is 
remarkable. In fact, that it was the same newspaper that supported apartheid 
for a long time that put the spotlight on the Reitz Four case could represent a 
step away from the past. Other major newspapers like The Star, Sowetan, and 
Mail&Guardian emphasized the outrage of the general public over the incident. 
These positions show proof that acts of racism could be the object of much 
criticism. The greatest limitation to this argument is the fact that most press 
stories focused on the case from a largely individualistic point of view. For 
instance, journalists gave much attention to the students who perpetrated the 
acts and the judiciary process they were involved in subsequently. In contrast, 
the victims of the video remained in the background of the stories. Their 
perspectives or opinions about what they went through almost never made the 
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headlines. This framework could have taken away the spotlight from the issues 
of institutionalized racism that later on, the new Vice-chancellor attempted to 
address. 
A deeper reflection on the state of race relations in the country as whole 
seemed to have failed to materialize, if the newspapers‘ approach to the story is 
a legitimate representation of the main perspectives and interests of society. 
Largely, the debate swirled around the perpetrators of the video, some 
reference to the institutional environment at UFS, and at best, issues of racism 
in higher education. Neither was a connection to the TRC made at this point. At 
least in newspapers, a concrete discussion on how the transitional justice 
process might have accounted for the unchallenged features of apartheid did 
not emerge. References to an ongoing problem of a racist mentality among 
certain groups, particularly political parties like the FF+ that still advocate for 
racial segregation and a lack of oversight at academic institutions were made.  
Where a discussion on the morality and appropriateness of approaches to 
justice and redress did figure was a year after this incident took place. The 
decision of a new Vice-chancellor, unexpected and controversial, provoked yet 
another round of national debate that this time did resemble the discussions 
around the TRC.  
A Bid for Reconciliation and its Repercussions 
Professor Jonathan Jansen, the newly appointed 2009 vice-chancellor of 
UFS (the equivalent of the President of a university in the US), framed his 
decision to withdraw charges against the Reitz Four students, along with 
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compensating the victims, as a gesture of acknowledgment of the institution‘s 
responsibility in the matter and a step towards reconciliation and 
transformation. As the first Black vice-chancellor at UFS, Jansen was a highly-
regarded professor who held various academic degrees, including a PhD in 
Education from Stanford University as a Fulbright scholar.329 In October 2009, 
his decision was a focal point of his inauguration speech:  
―In a gesture of racial reconciliation, and the need for healing, the 
University of the Free State will withdraw its own charges against the 
four students. The University will therefore not pursue any further 
action against the four young men implicated in the Reitz incident. In 
this spirit of toenadering (raprochement), the University will go further, 
and invite those four students to continue their studies here.  
In recognition of our institutional complicity in the Reitz saga, and the 
need for social justice, the University of the Free State will not only 
pursue forgiveness but will also pay reparations to the workers 
concerned for damages to their dignity and their self-esteem.‖330  
This redefined position on the case was a part of Jansen‘s larger agenda of 
radically transforming the university.  
The Vice-chancellor believed that the university had to accept its own 
responsibility in the matter. Clearly, structural conditions at the institutional 
level contributed to the kind of environment conducive to instances like the 
Reitz Four. He thought it wrong to understand the Reitz Four solely in 
individual terms and reminded the audience that racial tensions had been 
building up before the video scandal, showing evidence of a much deeper 
problem that could not be solved by punishing a few: 
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―You see, the biggest mistake made in the analysis of Reitz is to explain 
the incident in terms of individual pathology. Yet to dismiss the video as 
a product of four bad apples is too easy an explanation. This video 
recording was preceded by a long series of racial incidents protesting 
racial integration especially in the residences of the university. Not all of 
these racially charged incidents made the press; in fact, had it not been 
for the public release of the video recording, no-one outside the 
university would have known about it.‖331   
For this reason, he believed that a legal approach, with its court setting, would 
not solve the ―deeper issues of racism and bigotry that conflict [the] university‖, 
and added that unless something different was done, the university will 
continue dealing in the future with the ―…same social, cultural and ideological 
complexities that stand in the way of transformation.‖332 Moreover, the vice-
chancellor called for the re-opening of the Reitz residence in the hope that it 
would become a model for racial reconciliation and social justice. In addition, 
he expressed his intention of establishing The Reitz Institute for Studies in Race, 
Reconciliation and Social Justice,333 which in fact was inaugurated in January 2011 
as the International Institute for the Studies of Race, Reconciliation and Social 
Justice.334 Jansen‘s speech, in particular the withdrawal of charges, was met with 
immediate and overwhelming criticism from the population and most 
newspapers.  
 Even though the criminal charges against the students remained in 
Bloemfontein‘s regional court, the decision of the vice-chancellor was the object 
of much disapproval. Soon after the decision hit the headlines, Jansen issued a 
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media statement in which he reiterated the following: ―The criminal charges 
against the students were laid by the Directorate of Special Prosecutions in the 
province, and the university has no say over those processes in criminal courts. 
That process remains in place.‖ He added that ―the university simply withdrew 
its own complaint against the students…and on that basis decided to invite the 
students back to continue their studies.‖335 Nevertheless, a number of 
newspapers echoed the resentment of large parts of the population. The Sunday 
Times, South Africa‘s largest newspaper, sold the story under the headline of 
―Jansen ‗racists‘ pardon slated: Vice-chancellor ‗should have punished‘ the 
Reitz Four.‖336 ―UFS racists free‖ read the cover-page of the Saturday Star, the 
weekend edition of The Star, a daily newspaper which has 50% Black 
readership.337 The story stressed the ―outrage‖ that followed the dropping of 
charges against the students.338  
For the most part, the ANC -the official party in government- declared 
that the vice-chancellor‘s decision was wrong for two reasons. First, the charges 
were withdrawn without admission of guilt and a formal apology from the 
perpetrators to the victims. Themba Maseko, the government spokesman, said: 
―The process that led to the dropping of the charges was flawed in that it did 
not follow the established norm of getting the perpetrators to admit guilt, to 
apologize to the victims before any charges could be dropped and to initiate a 
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reconciliation process.‖339Also, the victims were not consulted as to whether 
they would feel comfortable with pardoning the students without proper 
redress for the damage that was done to them. The ANC Youth League 
spokesman, Floyd Shivambu, noted that people were still unaware if the 
perpetrators felt any remorse for their acts and if the victims would find peace 
without a proper judicial process.340 For these reasons, the Minister of Higher 
Education, Blade Nzimande, argued that the decision of Professor Jansen 
amounted to a superficial trade-off: ―[He] has taken it upon himself to absolve 
the perpetrators on behalf of the victims and compensate the victims on behalf 
of the perpetrators.‖341 In the view of the Minister, this trade-off sadly meant 
more damage to the dignity of the victims. In taking a different approach to the 
case, the vice-chancellor appeared to have further divided society on how to 
deal with racism.342  
These positions were strikingly similar to a number of perspectives 
towards amnesty for the perpetrators during apartheid and the TRC process in 
general. The newspapers primarily reflected a sense of justice unfulfilled with 
the decision of the vice-chancellor, similar to the sentiments that many victims 
expressed towards the provision of amnesty and the TRC process in general. 
The idea that drove people‘s reactions in both instances (the TRC period and 
the reconciliation effort of the vice-chancellor) was that justice, understood 
solely in the form of judicial trials and punishment, cannot be replaced with any 
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alternative mechanism. In the Reitz Four case people were demanding that the 
students be sanctioned properly by a court for their actions, in the same way 
that victims of apartheid claimed that the torture and the killings of apartheid 
could not under any circumstance be pardoned. At the core of the students‘ 
behavior as well as in many of the acts of apartheid supporters was a racist 
mindset that needed to be castigated with a due judicial process. The desire to 
punish incidents motivated by racism surfaced with the Reitz Four like it did 
during the TRC process. People‘s negative reactions to the decision of the Vice-
chancellor also have hinted at an ambition to not grant the kind of impunity 
that people in the past, or specifically Mamdani‘s ‗beneficiaries‘, perhaps 
enjoyed with the lack of punishment of racism. Hence, many could have 
perceived Jansen‘s redefined approach to the case as an inadmissible violation 
of due justice.  
 The ANC, albeit highly critical of the withdrawal of charges, seemed to 
be rather more preoccupied about the manner in which the vice-chancellor 
proceeded. The reaction of some party and government members seemed to be 
informed with the same principle that established conditionality to the 
provision of amnesty during the TRC. As noted in Chapter 3, the Commission 
operated under the condition of full disclosure of the truth and public 
recognition of wrongdoing before the granting of amnesty. This condition was a 
breakthrough, because had the Post-amble of the Constitution, which 
guaranteed the provision of amnesty, been followed without objection, 
perpetrators of apartheid might have only needed to request amnesty to receive 
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it. In this sense, the TRC set a remarkable precedent because it ensured some 
degree of accountability from them. To an extent, the words of the government 
spokesman Themba Maseko were a request for the same type of accountability 
that the mandate of the TRC put in place, because while he did not condemn 
the vice-chancellor‘s attempt, he challenged the initiation of a ‗process of 
reconciliation‘ without firstly providing the guarantee that the perpetrators 
recognized and assumed their guilt. Although the ANC Youth League 
spokesman did call for a fair judicial process for the students, he also 
mentioned the discomfort with the fact that the perpetrators had not expressed 
remorse clearly. Given that the students had not asked for forgiveness and since 
a proper measure of redress for the victims‘ had not been discussed, a judicial 
mechanism would be better suited for the case. The Higher Education Minister 
dismissed the vice-chancellor‘s decision on similar grounds, but was much 
more skeptical of the very attempt at reconciliation. The claim that the vice-
chancellor had in fact further eroded any sense of national unity with such an 
approach could be understood as saying that most South Africans agreed that 
racism needed to be punished judicially, and that he was going against the will 
of many individuals.  
Views supporting the Vice-chancellor were minimal. Nevertheless, some 
newspapers and particular individuals did take a more overarching approach 
to the case. For instance, the Canvas Life section of the Saturday Star newspaper 
presented a broader analysis, spelling out the reasons why the Vice-chancellor‘s 
decision was highly contentious. The headline of an entire page read ―Vexed 
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varsity‘s new broom‖, followed by the statement ―A brave new vice-chancellor 
won‘t just mop up the mess from one ugly racial incident…‖343  Two problems 
were identified. First, confusion about the different legal processes underway 
appeared to fuel the sense of outrage of some people. Second, the fact that the 
workers were not consulted before any decision the vice-chancellor reached his 
decision deepened some people‘s sense of injustice.   
A key aspect of the article was its reference to a lingering sentiment of 
uneasiness among people because appropriate judiciary measures to punish 
racism had not been established yet. The article stressed that the academic‘s 
decision would be praised as an act of reconciliation ―in a country still troubled 
by the pain of the past‖, but that he would be equally ―vilified for, at the very 
least, not giving Adams, Koko, Phororo, Ntseng and Molete the opportunity to 
be the catalysts of a formal court discussion about race that has been waiting for 
years in the wings of our democracy.‖344 The last statement is particularly 
important, because it alludes to a desire of having a discussion in South Africa 
that would specifically tackle the problem of racism. Moreover, the framing of 
the discussion as a ―formal court discussion‖ suggests the aspiration of 
punishing racism through a court setting, and as far as the legal system would 
allow.  
A couple of newspapers concentrated on Jansen‘s argument of 
institutional responsibility rather than on the fact that the students would be 
pardoned with his decision. The Mail&Guardian, a weekly newspaper known 
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for its in-depth coverage of political analysis, focused on the need to recognize 
the larger issues of racism at UFS.345 Similarly, the Business Day, South Africa‘s 
business daily newspaper, praised Jansen‘s announcement and called it a 
―brave decision‖ in its editorial.346 Beeld and Die Burger, both Afrikaan-speaking 
newspapers, reflected the controversy that the decision had caused, but 
refrained from framing the issue in a condemnatory way. The headline of Beeld 
read ―Reitz: Offenders are welcome again, says Prof. Jansen‖347, and Die 
Burger’s remarked: ―Jansen invited Reitz 4 back ‗as gesture of reconciliation and 
healing.‘348 
 Among the few people who came forward to support the vice-
chancellor, were Desmond Tutu and the deputy chief executive of the South 
African Institute of Race Relations, Frans Conje. Tutu publicly supported 
Jansen‘s gesture, expressing that the new rector had made South Africans 
proud and reminding everyone of what could have happened had the country 
chosen revenge rather than the process of the TRC.349 Frans Conje called critics 
to reconsider their positions and praise Jansen‘s decision for what it was, 
courageous and exemplary. He reminded people that in the 1990s, many 
supporters of apartheid offered apologies to the point of insincerity. Contrary to 
the view of the Minister of Higher Education, Conje believed that Jansen was 
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setting an extraordinary precedent, because, as a Black man, it could only be 
remarkable that he would be calling for reconciliation. He said: ―Here was a 
black man assuming the responsibility for what the white guard had done 
before him, and apologizing to the country for that.‖350 Such support for 
Jansen‘s position was in line with the views of people who stressed the need to 
reconcile and to focus on restoration after apartheid, rather than to choose 
revenge and retribution. The newspapers that focused on the institutional 
issues of UFS put forward arguments that resembled the support for a truth-
telling mechanism over prosecutions. Their emphasis was on the idea that 
punishment of a few individuals would not fix the much deeper structural 
problems of racism.  
Reflecting on Conje‘s comments, it could be said that Jansen followed the 
steps of Nelson Mandela or Desmond Tutu. Jansen, as the first Black man to 
become vice-chancellor of a historically white-Afrikaner university, emulated 
Tutu and the former president, himself the first democratically elected Black 
president of South Africa, by requesting a departure from the past via the path 
of reconciliation and not vengeance. For the symbolism, Jansen‘s gesture was 
comparable to the time when Mandela attended a rugby match of the world 
cup competition - rugby being a traditionally Afrikaner sport - wearing the 
jersey of the team. His reasoning was in tune with scholars who supported the 
TRC and considered that mechanisms of justice other than trials might do more 
for the advancement and the entrenchment of a culture respectful of human 
                                                          
350
 supra note 304 
129 
 
rights. In addition, Jansen‘s decision was accompanied by a commitment for 
institutional transformation, such as making classes of African-speaking 
languages like isiZulu and isiXhosa compulsory for Afrikaner students, while 
Afrikaans would be mandatory for Blacks.351 Also, the inauguration of the 
International Institute for the Studies of Race, Reconciliation and Social Justice in 
January 2011 shows evidence of the continuing efforts to move away from the 
legacy of apartheid and the racist elements that led to the Reitz Four incident. 
Yet, a year before this event took place, in April 2010, the murder of Eugene 
Terre‘Blanche took place, shaking the conscience of South Africans and again 
earning the attention of the international media.  
Eugene Terre’Blanche: A Man and his Race 
 Just as the Reitz Four saga became a nationwide topic for debate, the 
murder of the Afrikaner leader Eugene Terre‘Blanche in 2010 motivated 
another discussion that brought to the forefront the issue of racism from a 
different angle. In contrast to the Reitz Four case, the notoriety of 
Terre‘blanche‘s murder was as much as result of his historical position, coupled 
with the fact that two of his African workers murdered him on his own farm. 
The killing unleashed a debate with a number of important layers. As a founder 
of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging or most commonly known as AWB 
(Afrikaner Resistance Movement in English)352 and as the leader of the hard-
line resistance against the impending demise of apartheid, the murder of 
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Eugene Terre‘Blanche highlighted the interplay of politics and race in South 
Africa. On one hand, it put the spotlight on the political role of Eugene 
Terre‘Blanche in the past and sparked a debate about his influence in the 
present. On the other hand, the issue became all the more controversial because 
it happened only a few months after Julius Malema, leader of the African 
National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), was accused of inciting racial 
violence for singing a song from apartheid‘s resistance years with the lyrics 
―shoot the boer‖ in it (boer is the Afrikaans word for farmers, especially 
Afrikaner farmers). For this reason, newspaper headlines reflected the 
speculations of growing racial divisions in the country and the potential for 
violent racial conflict. In fact, the AWB used the instance as an opportunity to 
show evidence of the alleged dangers that the Afrikaner community faces in the 
new South Africa, particularly the violent attacks against white farmers. 
However, some commentators disagreed that the murder was a by-product of 
racial tensions and argued that class status was a better determinant of this 
incident.  
  The Terre‘Blanche case provides important insights for the analysis of 
contemporary race relations in South Africa as a potential function of the TRC 
process and the media. On one level, the murder exposed how political actors 
and specific ideologies continue to exacerbate racial tensions, thereby 
challenging the idea that a full departure from attitudes of the past has been 
achieved. For instance, both Terre‘Blanche and Malema had been responsible 
for using language that could incite racial division and racial violence. Also, the 
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AWB‘s relentless demand for racial segregation, similar to the ideology of the 
FF+, shows that remnants of the divisive racist ideology which kept apartheid 
in place still remain. On another level, the Terre‘Blanche murder initiated a 
debate about the nature of violence in South Africa and its connection to race.  
An aspect of the discussion focused on ‗farm attacks‘, an issue that affects the 
Afrikaner community most prominently. The fact that many Afrikaners believe 
that these are attacks fueled by racism, disregarding the fact that crime is 
widespread and that, in fact, Blacks are more likely to be assaulted by other 
Blacks, shows proof of an ongoing distrust towards members of other races. 
Also, the heightened fears of a potential breakout of racial violence that loomed 
in the aftermath of the murder point to persistent racial tensions in the country. 
At the same time, the fact that no major event of racial violence materialized 
after the murder –despite its anticipation by the international media in contrast 
to the less sensationalist tone of local newspapers- could underpin the 
argument that factors other than race play a more relevant role in incidents of 
violence.  
 Terre’Blanche’s Murder: the Case 
 On April 3, 2010, news that Eugene Terre‘Blanche, the leader of the 
AWB, had been found murdered on his farm spread quickly around the 
country. Two African male workers on Terre‘Blanche‘s farm located, on the 
outskirts of the town of Ventersdorp in the North West province of the country, 
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were charged with the murder.353 On April 6, the suspects Chris Mahlangu (27) 
and a 15-year-old minor appeared at the Ventersdorp Magistrate‘s Court amid 
tight police security due to fears of violent encounters between supporters of 
Terre‘Blanche and black residents who were present.354 The accused faced 
charges of ―murder, housebreaking with intent to rob, robbery with 
aggravating circumstances, crimen injuria and attempted robbery.‖355 
According to the police, the mutilated body of Terre‘Blanche was found on his 
bed with his pants pulled down, and a panga (machete) and a knobkerrie (cane) 
were lying around him, signs of the violent nature of murder.356   
Terre’Blanche in Politics 
Eugene Terre‘Blanche embodied the racism and violence that 
characterized apartheid South Africa. In the 1970‘s, he founded the Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging movement (AWB) to push a white supremacist agenda.357 
Flags with swastika-like symbols and neo-Nazi anthems were common features 
at gatherings of the movement‘s adherents.358 He is remembered as a ―powerful 
Afrikaans orator‖ who would appear at rallies riding a horse.359 He became 
particularly notable during the transitional period to democracy because he 
sought to destabilize the political negotiations through violent attacks and 
threats of civil war.360 In fact, a hundred people were injured and 21 people 
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died in one of his most brutal attacks.361 Nevertheless, his campaign failed to 
stop the eventual demise of the racist regime, and in 1998, he recognized his 
political and moral responsibility at a TRC hearing for some of the deadly 
violence that threatened to destabilize the 1994 elections.362 Terre‘Blanche‘s 
prominence during apartheid and his ideals would play a negligible role in 
post-apartheid South Africa. 
Although Terre‘Blanche‘s rhetoric was largely discredited in the new 
democratic order, he continued to advocate for a racially segregated South 
Africa. His insistence that a multiracial democracy would fail, coupled with a 
shameful three-year term in jail for assaulting a Black gas station attendant and 
attempting to kill a Black security guard made him earn even the contempt of 
some Afrikaners.363 For these reasons, for the most part he kept a low-profile 
after his jail release in 2004. Speaking about Terre‘Blanche‘s influence, Allister 
Sparks expressed: ―He was a has-been personality…his influence is absolutely 
minimal. I regarded him as one of the most remarkably powerful orators I‘ve 
ever heard. He spoke with great passion and could really move people, but that 
was before 1994 when he was trying to mount his rather crazy resistance 
campaign.‖364 Yet, Terre‘Blanche‘s desire to keep the races apart never wained. 
One year before his death, he attempted to make a comeback in politics by 
declaring his intentions of rallying Afrikaner far-right groups behind the 
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secessionist goal of establishing an Afrikaner republic. This republic would 
stand in Northern Natal and the Eastern Transvaal, today the provinces of 
Kwa-Zulu Natal and Mpumalanga respectively, which, according to him, were 
territories that belong to the boerevolk (Dutch settlers‘ land) by divine right.365 
He also justified his claims by pointing at the dangers that Afrikaners faced in a 
racially-integrated country. Terre‘Blanche argued that the unity of the new 
South Africa was the cause of all the contemporary maladies that pervaded 
society. ―It‘s about the right of a nation that wants to separate itself from a unity 
state filled with crime, death, murder, rape, lies and fraud‖ he once said.366 
Although his ideas never materialized, they became significant in the 
discussion that took place after his murder. In the same way, the inflammatory 
rhetoric of ANC leader Julius Malema gained importance as some 
commentators blamed him for heating up the political atmosphere which could 
trigger racial violence.  
 Who is Julius Malema? 
 Immediately after the death of Terre‘Blanche, a wave of accusations was 
directed at the ANC Youth League main leader Julius Malema for what some 
commentators considered to be his role in inciting racial violence against white 
farmers. In order to understand the reason why Malema‘s comments have 
earned the attention of the public and have become the object of much debate 
until today, his influence of in South African politics has to be examined first. 
Born in Polokwane, the capital of Limpopo- in northern region of the country- 
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and coming from a poor rural background, Malema rose to forefront of the 
political arena in the ANC through its Youth League, which is, according to 
Mail&Guardian political reporter Mandy Roussow, ―a powerful lobby group 
that prides itself in selecting the future ANC president.‖367 Malema has claimed 
that he was recruited into the party at the age of nine, and that by the age of 
thirteen he was given a handgun to attend the funeral of anti-apartheid Chris 
Hani in Johannesburg.368 He ascended the ranks of the party structure 
surrounded by well-known ANC leaders such as the late Peter Mokaba, 369  who 
once himself was an ANC Youth League leader and a popular militant of the 
resistance against apartheid, known for shout the slogan ―Kill the farmer, kill 
the boer‖ at rallies in the 1980s and 1990s.370 In fact, when Malema was 
indirectly associated with the murder of Terre‘Blanche, an AWB leader 
compared him to Mokaba.  
By April 2008, Malema took on the presidency of the Youth League.371 
―Being Youth League president,‖ Roussow explains, ―made Malema a force to 
be reckoned with in the South African political scene, a position which he used 
to his full advantage.‖372 The fact that he was elected president by the youth of a 
key establishment of the ANC is telling of the influence that Malema wields, 
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even though he is also disliked by many people in society.373 Malema draws his 
power from his own character- a powerful mixture of demagoguery and 
bluntness that makes him earn both respect and fear among those who 
surround him: ―Although Malema holds no official government position and is 
only an ad hoc member of the ANC‘s powerful national working committee 
(NWC), he knows that when he talks, everyone—inside and outside the ANC—
listens.‖374 His remarks and the issues in which he has been involved 
continuously have been the subject of newspaper headlines. At the same time, 
issues that he has brought up have been received with skepticism and 
sometimes condemnation within his own party.375  
Of the issues that have raised Malema‘s profile, his support for a 
nationalization plan that could mirror the problematic experience of 
neighboring Zimbabwe, particularly with land reform, has been the object of 
concern and speculation inside and outside the ANC. While the Terre‘Blanche 
murder was making the headlines, Malema publicly praised President Robert 
Mugabe‘s economic policies at a rally in a township of Harare, the capital of 
Zimbabwe. He expressed his approval of the contested land reform record of 
the country, which at some point has been based on drastic and even violent 
measures of seizures of white-owned land. He proclaimed that he would bring 
that strategy to South Africa, and justified the confiscation of property on the 
grounds of race: ―In South Africa we are just starting. Here in Zimbabwe you 
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are already very far. The land question has been addressed. We are very happy 
that today you can account for more than 300,000 new farmers against the 4000 
who used to dominate agriculture. We hear you are now going going straight to 
the mines. That‘s what we are going to be doing in South Africa.‖376 In specific 
reference to white-ownership of mines in South Africa, he added, ―We want the 
mines. They have been exploiting our minerals for a long time. Now it‘s our 
turn to also enjoy from these minerals. They are so bright, they are colorful, we 
refer to them as white people. Maybe their color came as a result of exploiting 
our minerals.‖377  
These comments were all the more significant because not only was 
Malema‘s behavior being the target of widespread criticism, but he was also 
contravening Zuma‘s political agenda. For instance, while Malema was siding 
himself with the ZANU-PF (Mugabe‘s political party) and its tactics, President 
Jacob Zuma was engaged in negotiations to settle a deal between President 
Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai.378 In spite of several attempts 
to minimize the implications of his nationalization proposal by saying that no 
Zimbabwean style ‗land-grabs‘ would happen in South Africa, his demeaning 
comments about president Jacob Zuma, coupled with an incident in which he 
verbally confronted and insulted a BBC journalist at a news conference, 
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motivated the ANC to undertake a disciplinary process for Malema.379 His final 
sentence included taking anger management classes and making a public 
apology for his careless references about the president.380 In fact, he was put 
down by Zuma for wanting to make nationalization an ANC policy at an ANC 
conference in Durban in September 2010.381 Malema, however, did not become 
associated to the murder of the AWB leader simply because of his personality. 
A particular event that took place a month before the murder of Terre‘Blanche 
ignited a row of discussion on the implications of using of anti-apartheid 
struggle songs and symbols in the post-apartheid period.  
What is in a Song and a Farm 
On March 10, 2010, Malema led a student protest at the University of 
Johannesburg in the Gauteng province in which he made derogatory comments 
about opposition leaders like Helen Zille of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and 
Patricia de Lille of the Independent Democrats (ID).382  Yet, the focus of outrage 
was a song from the anti-apartheid period which contained the lyrics ―shoot the 
boer‖ (kill the farmer) in it.383 Condemnation by members of parties like the 
Freedom Front and the Afrikanerbond organization followed immediately, and 
an order was issued by the North Gauteng High Court which prohibited 
Malema from singing the song again.384 Yet, with the murder of the AWB 
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leader, some people argued that at some level, Malema was largely to blame. In 
this context also, the general state of insecurity that white farmers have suffered 
since the end of apartheid was highlighted, although the connection between 
the post-apartheid state and these attacks has been hard to prove.385  
Analyses of the possible motivations of farm attacks discredit racism as a 
explanatory variable. Farm attacks have been defined as a particularly violent 
phenomenon that originated in the 1990s, whereby a large number of white 
farmers were the targets of attacks, some of them characterized by their extreme 
brutality.386 These attacks built the misleading perception among members of 
the Afrikaner community that the state wanted to drive them out of their land, 
even though a commission of inquiry in 2001 revealed that Blacks were also the 
object of this type of violence. Furthermore, out of the 3000 farm attacks that 
took place from 1998 to 2001, only 2% appeared to have a racial or political 
motive.387 In the words of Johan Burger from the Institute for Security Studies, 
―all research so far show[ed] that far more than 90% of these attacks can be 
attributed to simple crime—robbery [was] the main motive.‖388 However, a 
Human Rights Watch study in 2001 showed that a number of white farmers still 
believed the attacks were part of a larger plan by the government to drive them 
off their lands.389 With the murder of Terre‘Blanche, these perceptions fed into 
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the fears of racial violence. The reactions to the murder from AWB leaders were 
also the cause of more concern. 
Reactions 
 The responses to the murder of Terre‘Blanche from some AWB leaders 
fed into fears of racial conflict in the country. The event, which was highly 
publicized in the local and international media, turned into an opportunity for 
AWB leaders to make intimidating statements that contributed to the rising 
tension. Andre Visagie, AWB spokesperson, said that the party would seek 
ways to ―avenge‖ the death of Terre‘Blanche, a death that he considered to be 
―a declaration of war by the Black community of South Africa to the white 
community.‖390 Also, the attention of the media gave the new AWB leader Peter 
Steyn van Ronge a platform to forward Terre‘Blanche‘s political agenda. In 
front of the court where the two murder suspects appeared, Steyn made 
comments that echoed Terre‘Blanche‘s secessionist goals: ―All we want is a 
piece of land in South Africa where we can settle ourselves and call it our own 
and govern ourselves with our religion…and our own laws.‖391 These 
comments were made amid the fraught atmosphere that characterized the court 
appearance, where police had to set up barbed-wire to separate white and Black 
locals as a measure that would deter them from a engaging in a scuffle.392 The 
same tense mood was seen at Terre‘Blanche‘s funeral, an event that also 
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demanded tight police security.393 Here, AWB followers took the opportunity to 
make public their loyalty to the movement by singing the apartheid era national 
anthem Die Stem and carrying flags with swastika-like symbols.394 In the same 
way, expressions of disenchantment with the government were particularly 
focused on Malema. Afrikaner singer Hofmeyr said: ―If you understand the 
hate speech of [ANC Youth League president Julius] Malema, you must 
understand why I cannot enter a stadium named after Peter ―kill the boer‖ 
Mokaba.‖395  
 When put in context, the political ideology of movements like 
Terre‘Blanche‘s AWB as well as Malema‘s provocative rhetoric could be taken 
as evidence of a lack of fundamental change in some aspects of the political 
culture of South Africa. It could be argued that the TRC process, which focused 
on a narrow number of human rights violations, could account for an apparent 
failure in pending attitudinal elements that can stir up racial divisions. That 
white supremacist ideologies are still part of the political fabric of South Africa 
is rather unsettling. At the same time, it is equally problematic that Malema, as 
a representative of the youth wing of the official party in government, revived a 
highly polarizing song from the apartheid era fifteen years after the demise of 
the regime. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that movements like the AWB 
which have an exclusively segregationist agenda do not garner widespread 
support from the population.396 Also, major parties‘ firm condemnation and 
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rejection of attitudes that controversial figures like Malema embody 
demonstrate that a system of checks and balances is in place, and that racist or 
inflammatory comments of any nature are not taken lightly.  
At another level, the misleading perceptions that some members of the 
Afrikaner community have about farm attacks speak of a prejudicist, racist 
mindset that still inform some people‘s judgments. In this respect, James 
Gibson‘s claim that the TRC process helped to change images of the ―enemy‖ is 
challenged. It could also be said that it is not racism but a lack of information 
that fuels these perceptions. Yet, it cannot be assumed that with better 
information people would change their views of others just as much as it could 
not be asserted that the TRC‘s even-handed approach effectively helped to defy 
racial categorizations. Yet, the way the national newspapers framed the murder 
show that, in spite of the fact that a prominent white figure was killed by two 
black workers, racism may not be necessarily a source of violent conflict.  
The Media’s Spotlight on Terre’Blanche 
The murder of the AWB leader caught the attention of people in South 
Africa and abroad. The fact that it took place only months before the Football 
World Cup could have intensified the particular interest of the international 
media on the case. At the same time, the framing and the reflection of 
international media outlets in comparison to local newspapers‘ approach to the 
case was interesting. National newspapers largely focused on the political 
figure of Terre‘Blanche and echoed the fears of racial violence. Nevertheless, 
none reflected on this event as evidence of failure of the post-apartheid state to 
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bridge the racial gaps. The Sunday Times headline read: ―Terre‘Blanche killed: 
Hacked to death on his own farm.‖ The lead of the story stressed the violence 
that was espoused by the leader and his record as a white supremacist: ―Eugene 
Terre‘Blanche‘s violent life came to a brutal end last night…In 1970, 
Terre‘Blanche founded the fringe right-wing AWB, and spent three decades 
championing white supremacy.‖397 Beeld remarked ―Eugene Terre‘Blanche 
killed‖ in its headline, followed by a summary of police allegations on the case. 
398 The Mail&Guardian highlighted the role of the farmworkers (―Eugene 
Terre‘Blanche killed after row with farmworkers‖) including a lengthy 
description of Terre‘Blanche‘s political ideology and history. The lead of the 
story was as follows: ―Eugene Terre‘Blanche, who once threatened to wage war 
rather than allow black rule in South Africa was hacked to death at his farm on 
Saturday following an argument with two employees.‖399 In the days after the 
murder, attention shifted to the court appearance of the accused farmers and 
the funeral of the AWB leader, but beyond these As these events were taking 
place, analyses in the international media establishments were that the murder 
showed proof that South Africa continues to be a racially divided country with 
potential for racial conflict. 
International news outlets delivered the news of the murder and the 
aftermath as evidence of ongoing racism in the country. Time magazine‘s 
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headline read: ―In South Africa, Murder in Black and White.‖400 The analysis of 
CNN mentioned the divisive and racist record of Terre‘Blanche, while it also 
refered to South Africans allegedly fearing that the murder could be a sign that 
the country, once again, was on the grip of ―racial hatred.‖401 The Guardian of 
the UK implied that some Afrikaners‘ ―sense of vulnerability‖, born out of fears 
that Blacks will take away their lands or that South Africa will become ―another 
Zimbabwe‖, impinges on the process of reconciliation that Mandela strove to 
establish.402 In its headline, a BBC article emphasized the emotionally charged 
event of the murder (―Anger and anxiety after Terre‘Blanche murder‖). Most 
prominent, however, was the reference to the likelihood that the murder would 
escalate to the point of violent racial conflict. The reference alluded to the 
history of the country and the supposedly unchallenged racist attitudes that still 
haunt South African society: ―This murder has the power to unleash the 
demons of deep-seated racial hatred that have bedeviled this country for three 
centuries.‖403 In the extreme side of these types of analyses of the killing, a 
column by Andrew Bolt, a co-editor at the Herald Sun (Australia‘s largest 
newspaper) announced in its title ―New Racism grips South Africa.‖404 The 
author highlighted the alleged indirect role of Malema in the killing, and 
warned the following: ―South Africa is sliding back into a new racial divide, 
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perhaps even a new apartheid. And this time most of the racists and thugs are 
black.‖405 In spite of the negative forecasts about the implications of the murder, 
no major violent event materialized in actuality, which is a fact that puts to 
question the extent to which racism could be the source of conflict.  
What explains the approach of South African newspapers to the murder 
could be the perception of the majority that racism would not be the trigger of 
conflict. The most prominent newspapers seemed to have paid more interest in 
the case because such a contentious figure was involved in it rather than 
because it was a murder in ‗black and white‘, as some international media 
establishments put it. Although the tension that followed the murder was 
identified in the headlines, the newstories did not go beyond that. No grand 
debate on the state of race relations in the country emerged, and not much 
reference to the possibility of racial conflict breaking out was made. For 
purposes of comparison, as the World Cup drew nearer to its finale, threats of 
xenophobic violence were captured in the headlines with much more 
anticipation than in the case of Terre‘Blanche. Instead, the wage dispute that 
could have motivated the killing figured more prominently, as well as the 
discussion on Malema‘s possible role in the incident or Terre‘Blanche‘s 
ideology. It could be argued that South African newspapers, in contrast to 
international media outlets, projected the right image that violent conflict of a 
racial nature in South Africa is rather uncontemporary.  
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ssessing the impact of truth-telling processes in post-conflict 
societies is a challenging task. It requires extensive and careful 
analysis of all the political and social factors that lead to the implementation of 
truth commissions, the capacities that are assigned to these commissions, and 
the expectations that people may have in regards to a particular transitional 
justice mechanism in order to make fair judgments about their effectiveness. 
Even when these elements are taken into consideration, many other factors may 
explain the subsequent outcomes of a truth telling-process that escape the range 
of assessments. However, in the South African case, as this thesis has shown, 
provides a wealth of knowledge and insight from which more can be learned 
about the work of a truth commission and the impact it may have had in the 
present.  
The question with which this research has wrestled specifically is 
whether there is relationship between contemporary race relations – a key to 
both South African history and the current reality of the country- and the 
transitional justice process. The views and critiques about the work of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the media during the 
transition to democracy and its effect on the present have been explored. Under 
the premise that reconciliation, one of the overarching goals of the TRC, would 
by virtue of the legacy of the racism of apartheid signify reconciliation among 
previously antagonistic racial groups, this thesis has examined the state of race 
relations in South Africa fifteen years after the transition. Two recent events- the 
 A 
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Reitz Four incident and the murder of AWB leader Eugene Terre‘Blanche- have 
served as case studies for this analysis. The nature of the debate that these 
events ensued, the larger issues that they brought up and the way the print 
media portrayed them, have offered ways to understand the hypothesis that 
has prompted this research. 
The preliminary hypothesis that has motivated this research is 
confirmed. The hypothesis that is stated in Chapter 1 reads as follows:  
―[…] the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), directed by the 
Parliamentary Act that established it, failed to properly integrate a 
discussion of race and racism into its work. Particularly, that the conflict 
came to be understood in terms of victims of a small scope of human 
rights violations and perpetrators of those violations posed certain 
limitations on reconciliation. In the same manner, the way in which the 
media reported the TRC process only added to a lack of structural 
analysis about apartheid. Although extensive, the media limited its work 
to covering the TRC hearings without subjecting the content of the 
information they gathered to deeper criticism. Hence, by ignoring the 
context of the events described and discussed in the Commission, the 
media deepened the analysis gap of the transitional justice process. 
Ultimately, the TRC and the media‘s downplay of race as the explanatory 
variable for the violations that occurred during apartheid may have 
contributed to race relations that remain problematic in contemporary 
South Africa.‖406 
Certainly, the findings of the case studies demonstrate that there are ongoing 
issues of racism in South Africa which can be correlated to the TRC and the 
media‘s work. Causation is less easy to determine, however. How exactly the 
process of the TRC, with the intervention of the print media that reflected this 
process and delivered it to larger society, could account for the number of 
issues that came up in the case studies that have been explored in this research 
is a question that could only be answered by drawing tentative connections. 
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Recognition of the fact that the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act no. 34, which established the TRC, delineated fundamental 
aspects of the scope of the Commission‘s work is imperative as well. It is 
important to acknowledge that at some levels, criticism of procedures or 
terminology of the TRC would be better directed at the Parliamentary Act 
which created the Commission. This means that, although the focus of this 
research is on race relations as a function of the TRC, a number of conditions of 
the truth-telling process that are the object of debate in this analysis, such as the 
terms ‗victims‘ and ‗perpetrators‘, were pre-defined in the Act.407 Nevertheless, 
although the Commission was circumscribed by the terms of the Act that 
established it, it could have still done much more than what it actually did to 
avoid the exclusion of a much needed structural analysis of apartheid. The 
same can be said about the media. The close examination of the two case studies 
of this research offer insights into how contemporary race relations in South 
Africa bear the effect of some aspects of the transitional justice process.  
Features of the racist legacy of apartheid still remain in place in South 
Africa in ways that can support some of the criticism that has been made about 
the TRC process and what it actually delivered in terms of racial reconciliation. 
Some of the problematic aspects that came up in the case studies paint a rather 
fragmented picture of a post-apartheid, ‗post-TRC‘ South Africa which should 
have ideally overcome the main source of antagonisms of the past-in particular, 
race.  Following the argument of Madeleine Fullard and Nahla Valji in regards 
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to the ‗displacement of racism‘ from accounts of the TRC, and Anthea Garman‘s 
criticism of the media in general for having downplayed the explanatory value 
of racism for understanding the human rights violations of the past, the cases 
studies have shown that in fact the racist ideology that underpin the structural 
establishment of apartheid remains unchallenged at some levels. The degree of 
institutional segregation at the University of the Free State (UFS), the rejection 
of integration policies on the part of Afrikaner students, the salience of 
Afrikaner nationalism to justify segregationist political platforms, the role of 
leaders like the ANC Youth League President Julius Malema or Eugene 
Terre‘Blanche in mobilizing constituencies by inciting racial divisions and racial 
prejudices, and the level of mistrust and misunderstanding in the Afrikaner 
community in regards to ‗farm attacks‘ are issues that question the extent to 
which South Africans-particularly Afrikaners- are racially reconciled.  
The fact that many of the issues at UFS as well as at other institutions of 
higher education were born out of ongoing racism validates criticism of the 
TRC process. This fact underpins Valji‘s argument: ―The TRC has left many of 
the structures of inequality intact and unaddressed and has suppressed 
dialogue on the persistence of racism in the new South Africa.‖408 The 
institutional issues at UFS also support Fullard‘s assertion that the TRC‘s 
institutional hearings could not have done more for reconciliation because they 
were not the main focus of the process, but rather an ‗awkward‘ discontinuity 
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from the common procedures of the TRC.409 Hence, it could be said that a more 
ample discussion during the TRC process on the role of racism at the 
institutional level in apartheid could have undermined the racist foundations of 
establishments like the UFS. 
The largely negative reactions to the Vice-chancellor‘s decision, reflected 
in the most prominent newspapers of the country, could be the result of the sole 
focus of the TRC and the media on victims and perpetrators and a set number 
of human rights violations to the exclusion of a more structural analysis. Had 
the TRC, and the media, approached the apartheid‘s past from a more 
comprehensive angle (i.e. more regard to institutions, laws, and ideologies), 
more people could have felt part of the process and hence, express more 
supportive views towards the Vice-chancellor‘s decision of foregoing 
punishment and engaging in a conciliatory path. As Mamdani has argued, the 
narrow approach of the TRC had the effect of disengaging a large portion of the 
population who were victims as well as those who were apartheid‘s 
‗beneficiaries‘, thereby impinging on reconciliation.410 The exclusion of the 
theme of how racism affected the whole of society from the accounts of the 
Commission that Valji describes, and in the media‘s framing of the stories that 
covered the hearings which the MMG report has pointed at, could be reflecting 
itself in partial, individualized understandings of racist acts today in South 
Africa.  
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Both case studies show that there are still ideologies and political actors 
which promote attitudes from the past that exacerbate racial tensions. 
Inflammatory political platforms and rhetoric have a degree of influence in 
certain sectors of society in South Africa. The Afrikaner nationalism of political 
parties like the FF+ and AWB stirs racist sentiments and segregationist 
aspirations in their Afrikaner constituencies. Strategically, the FF+ and the AWB 
target audiences who feel vulnerable in a multiracial society that no longer 
guarantees the unfair privileges they used to have in the past. Their political 
demands are based on the same type of ideas that motivated apartheid era 
leaders to implement their racist laws. When these factors are taken into 
consideration, an essentially ‗Afrikaner‘ problem seems to emerge. A sense of 
not belonging in the new, multiracial South Africa appears to exist among some 
sectors of the Afrikaner population that denotes a lack of reconciliation from 
their side. Figures like Julius Malema would want to revive the memory of the 
struggle against apartheid, in detriment of racial reconciliation, in order to 
downplay the failure of the ANC ruling to deliver to a yet largely 
disenfranchised Black majority.  
Criticism of the TRC for having failed to reveal and condemn the racism 
behind the ‗politically motivated acts‘ that it explored finds some ground in the 
present when looking at the ideologies and attitudes of the political actors 
which are mentioned above. In lights of this, Valji‘s assertion that the TRC‘s 
‗political‘ label of human rights violations committed in the past disguised the 
racism that motivated those violations and ruled out a proper discussion and 
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condemnation of racism as such gains force.411 The platform of the FF+, Eugene 
Terre‘Blanche‘s AWB, and the comments of Julius Malema incite racism and 
racial conflict behind a political façade. These are elements that attack the 
‗rainbow nation‘ that Mandela envisioned. They foster the vilification of others 
and weaken integration efforts. They are a negation to the goals of ‗national 
unity and reconciliation‘ that the TRC aspired. They exploit people‘s fear and 
exacerbate their prejudices which lead up to racist acts such as the Reitz Four. 
In the same way that torture, killing and persecution could only have taken 
place in the past in an environment conducive to racism, these political parties 
and actors seek to enforce racial identities in order to advance particularly 
divisive agendas that could only bring back the past. Can the work of the TRC 
explain the continuity of these attitudes? Certainly, the TRC did not directly 
reject these types of attitudes. It condemned a number of human rights 
violations, but it did not hold perpetrators to account for the racism that 
motivated their actions and informed their political ideologies. This could have 
been the product of the even-handedness that the Commission embraced when 
assessing the violations. Had it not aspired to stay neutral in regards to human 
rights violations, a debate on the role of racism could have been initiated and 
extended. 
At the same time, although the Reitz Four incident and the Terre‘Blanche 
killing highlight the racist attitudes at the individual and group levels, it would 
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be unfair to make a generalization about the whole of society from these 
samples. It has to be noted that Terre‘Blanche and Malema fall toward the 
extreme of the political spectrum in South Africa. Terre‘Blanche did not have 
much prominence in the years after 1994, and Malema is a contemporary 
political figure who is better known for his controversial remarks and 
extravagant lifestyle rather than for enjoying wide support across the 
population. Furthermore, major parties swiftly condemned the role of political 
ideology in both incidents, which is a sign of a political culture that is 
increasingly more intolerant towards racism. At the same time, the larger issues 
that came to the forefront of the public discussion on the newspapers indicate 
that a lack of racial reconciliation is at work, which could be a result of the 
TRC‘s ‗de-racialization‘ of the past, as Fullard argues. Afrikaner farmers who 
hold onto the prejudicial belief that farm attacks are an attack on their race, 
groups of students who are opposed to racial integration, and young political 
leaders who rally support by using symbols from a time of violent conflict 
reveal the need for further progress in terms of racial reconciliation.  
While conjectures of a lack of racial reconciliation –a lack that can be 
related to the omission of a more assertive discussion on the role of racism 
during truth telling process- are valid, it is also worth nothing that the response 
to the challenges that racism posed in these cases studies speak of measure of 
progress that could also be attributed to a precedent set by the TRC. For 
instance, in spite of the bad press regarding the decision of the UFS Vice-
chancellor to drop the charges against the Reitz Four incident, the logic that 
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formed the basis of his decision resembles the ideological and moral 
foundations of restorative justice mechanisms which is consistent with the 
TRC‘s approach. Also, the fact that no major violent racial event materialized in 
the aftermath of the murder of Terre‘Blanche supports claims that racism is not 
a main catalyst for violent conflict. 
The restorative justice approach of the new Vice-chancellor of UFS not 
only shows signs of a positive post-TRC legacy, but is in fact the continuation of 
the process that the Commission sought to initiate. The vice-chancellor‘s 
position mirrors the TRC and other truth commissions foundations effectively: 
that it would take much more than trials and prosecutions to change the whole 
establishment of apartheid, and that any fractured society that aims to 
transform itself and move on from the past, as Alex Boraine has said, cannot 
count on punishment to restore the  broken social fabric. The fact that it was the 
first Black Vice-chancellor who apologized for the failures of his white 
predecessors to dismantle the racism that haunted UFS for decades puts him on 
the level of moral icons such as Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu. The Vice-
chancellor knew that given the historical record of the University and the 
number of larger racial issues that continued to affect the institution, 
punishment of the four Afrikaner students who attacked the dignity of the five 
Black workers would not end the racism that permeated the very structures of 
the university. Therefore, in the same way that the TRC took up the task of 
providing amnesty to the perpetrators of apartheid and acknowledging the 
victims as the first stepping stones in the direction of reconciliation, the Vice-
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chancellor sought to initiate his plan of transforming the university‘s culture by 
acknowledging that punishment would not set the right tone to fight against 
institutional racism. Both the TRC and the Vice-Chancellor attempted to bring 
together the people who would have to bear and drive forward the larger 
changes that need to take place. 
  Another positive development illustrated in the case studies is that in 
spite of expectations that the murder of Terre‘Blanche would ignite racial 
violence in the country, the largely peaceful response of the public proves that 
racism is not necessarily a factor that could lead to the escalation of violent 
conflict, as some studies have shown as well. Thus, it could also be argued that 
the TRC language of ‗victims and perpetrators‘ that Mamdani and Fullard 
criticize did change people‘s perceptions of each other, as Gibson has argued, 
and might account for the fewer number of events in which another person‘s 
race is the sole catalyst for violence in South Africa. The fact that no major 
events of racial violence materialized in the aftermath of Terre‘Blanche‘s killing 
represents a step forward in the dynamics of race relations in the country that 
could be taken as a measure of reconciliation, thus a correlation with the work 
of the TRC. A more relevant causal factor of violence, as statistics show, is class 
and not race, as was the case during apartheid. Furthermore, the absence of 
racial violence in this particular case also shows that the misleading claims and 
demands of the AWB or the FF+do not resonate with the greater bulk of society. 
Nevertheless, South Africa is still characterized by its high levels of violence. 
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This is a phenomenon that poses a great threat to the need to move away from 
the violent past. 
The case studies have shown that newspapers have at times framed 
racial issues better today than during the TRC process. At other times, however, 
they have failed to stress important aspects of events related to these incidents. 
In the Reitz Four case, newspapers of varied readership highlighted the 
wrongness of the acts perpetrated in the video. However, most newspapers 
largely concentrated on the few individuals involved in this particular case. 
This type of approach is precisely the one that critics saw as problematic during 
the TRC process. In delivering the findings of the hearings of the Commission 
to wider society, newspapers and other media outlets also simplified the 
conflict of the past by only highlighting the role of high profile perpetrators and 
a small number of victims. The negative portrayal of the Vice-chancellor‘s 
decision in the headlines of major newspapers, without regard to what his 
decision actually entailed, reflects a failure of not delving into a deeper 
understanding of the ‗institutional complicity‘ that the Vice-chancellor had 
referred to. In the present like in the past, most newspapers failed to address 
the bigger issues that were at work at UFS. As a result, it could be argued that a 
chance to initiate a public debate on the way racism impacts society was missed 
again.  
 The more nuanced approach to the murder of Terre‘Blanche by local 
newspapers is a positive aspect of print-media‘s current analysis of racial 
events. This approach also reinforces the argument that racism is no longer a 
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predictor of violence in South Africa. The framing of content in South African 
print media analyzed in this research has shown that they had a much better 
understanding of racial dynamics in the country than international media 
outlets. The predictions of imminent racial violence that major newspapers 
around the world made stood in sharp contrast to the focus of national 
newspapers on the minor relevance that Terre‘Blanche and his ideology 
enjoyed in the new South Africa.  
As part of the literature that assesses the work of truth commissions and 
the media in transitional justice processes, this thesis adds a qualitative analysis 
of one truth-telling process in particular that can serve as a guide for analysis of 
other experiences. The thesis exposes the complexity of measuring success or 
impact of a truth-telling process, but does not deny the possibility of drawing 
connections between contemporary events and justice efforts of the past. The 
inductive methodology that this thesis has relied on complements other 
research works that make use of quantitative tools. The methodology has 
revealed that some correlations can be established between the TRC, the media 
and racial reconciliation in South Africa.  
Causation is harder to prove with the case studies examined in this 
research. At the same time, this limitation opens up the opportunity for further 
research. For instance, more contemporary case studies could reveal more 
connections with the TRC process. Also, analysis of the framing of media 
outlets other than newspapers could add to the depth of any research. 
Furthermore, a comparative analysis of a truth commission that did or may 
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explicitly address racism in its work and the outcome of such an approach 
could show what other factors explain the development of racial relations in a 
post-conflict society.  
Certainly, this thesis could not have addressed all the elements that 
shape and define the state of race relations in South Africa today. In the same 
manner, the TRC and the media could only have done so much to establish a 
clean break from the past. Furthermore, in a now democratic South Africa, as 
this thesis has shown, even strong racial identities that have their origins in the 
long history of segregation of the country might not determine the outcomes of 
some incidents. However, the assessment of past efforts of redefining the 
attitudes and the ways people relate to each other show that there are 
opportunities for improvement. In South Africa, when apartheid affected such a 
large number of people in such varied ways, the truth-telling process could 
have been more inclusive and more critical of the establishments that sustained 
the racist regime. In this context, the media could have helped to shed light over 
those areas where the Commission could not reach. They could have held the 
people and the institutions that did not fall under the purview of the work of 
the TRC more accountable. The positive aspect of this reflection is that today, 
much more can still be done to rectify any shortcomings of the transitional 
justice process. When the sources of conflict of the past such as racism take the 
forefront of the national debate, the opportunity to initiate another round of 
efforts to move away from the past should not be missed.  
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